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THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF USING DISABILITY LAW
AS A TOOL FOR SCHOOL REFORM
Claire Raj*
Abstract: Advocates have recently devised a radical litigation approach to force broad
systemic changes in public schools using the most unlikely of tools: disability law. If they
succeed, disability law stands to eclipse any other cause of action as the most effective means
of school reform. This novel approach relies on groundbreaking research demonstrating a
correlation between Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) that children encounter outside
school and the learning challenges they face in school. Focusing on this link, advocates claim
that children from impoverished and crime-ridden neighborhoods, by virtue of where they live,
have disabilities that entitle them to system-wide school remedies under federal law.
While this litigation exposes the depth of student need in high-poverty communities, the
strategy is legally flawed and risks under-explored collateral consequences. Although
advocates are correct that many of these children warrant individual remedies, using disability
law to achieve system-wide educational reform is both unwise and unfeasible. First, such
claims falsely assume that schools must identify all students who have any type of disability,
when in fact schools’ substantive duties are limited to those students whose disabilities require
special education or related services to ensure meaningful access to education. Second,
disability law mandates services that meet individual students’ needs. Claims seeking schoolwide programmatic changes for all students are simply not legally required. Finally, classifying
entire communities as disabled is over-inclusive and has the potential to stigmatize, albeit
unfairly, all impoverished minority children as impaired.
This Article proposes a more nuanced litigation strategy and a broader legislative agenda.
First, advocates should use schools’ obligations to individual ACEs-impacted students to force
schools to adopt more effective early identification processes. Schools should not assume all
children have a disability, but identify those who do earlier. Second, federal and state
legislation should provide targeted grants to schools that serve a high percentage of students
impacted by ACEs. This approach would address unmet needs of students while guarding
against over-inclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
America’s public schools are overtasked, under-resourced, and
increasingly responsible for educating large communities of students with
unmet physical, medical, and psychological needs.1 While federal
programs exist to address some of these concerns, thus far, these programs
have proven insufficient to fully remediate the considerable challenges
facing public schools.2 Advocates are now attempting a creative and
radical litigation strategy to force broad-based changes in public schools.
And, they are using the most unlikely of tools—disability rights laws.3 If
they succeed, disability rights laws stand to eclipse any other cause of
action as a means of school reform.4 But before diving over this precipice,

1. ULRICH BOSER, PERPETUAL BAFFOUR & STEPH VELA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A LOOK AT
EDUCATION CRISIS: TESTS, STANDARDS, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 5 (Jan.
2016),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/21075127/TUDAreport.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QPS2-8PKH] (“While there has been substantial progress over the past decade—
particularly in cities and states that have embraced standards-based reform—the nation still faces a
pressing education crisis, particularly when it comes to students of color and students from lowincome backgrounds.”); see, e.g., S. EDUC. FOUND., A NEW MAJORITY: LOW INCOME STUDENTS
NOW
A
MAJORITY
IN
THE
NATION’S
PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
(2015),
https://www.southerneducation.org/Our-Strategies/Research-and-Publications/New-MajorityDiverse-Majority-Report-Series/A-New-Majority-2015-Update-Low-Income-Students-Now
[https://perma.cc/6DAT-5ZYL].
2. In fact, current federal funds constitute less than 10% of overall education spending. STEPHEN
Q. CORNMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2014–15 (FISCAL YEAR
2015) 4–5 (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018301.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBF6-2WH7]; see
generally BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD (2010), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxtYmwryVI00U2doWDhYUD
N6Ylk/view [https://perma.cc/BF2T-HFSE] (noting that funding levels nationally are well below
levels necessary for low-income students to achieve above-average outcomes); Joel Klein, The
Failure of American Schools, ATLANTIC (June 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archiv
e/2011/06/the-failure-of-american-schools/308497/ [https://perma.cc/8CNA-PLRX] (“[T]he gains
we have made in improving our schools are negligible—even though we have doubled our spending
(in inflation-adjusted dollars) on K-12 public education.”).
3. Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. CV-17-08004-PCT-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 29, 2018); P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
4. Currently, no general federal constitution cause of action for school reform exists because the
Supreme Court rejected education as a fundamental right. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).
Other federal claims with the potential for systemic relief, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–2000d-7 (2012), and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681–88 (2012), require plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination in order to win relief—
a burden few have managed to overcome. Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of
Action: The Court’s Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally
Funded Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358 (2008). Finally, while systemic claims for reform are generally
available under education clauses in state constitutions, those rights are perpetually difficult to
enforce. William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of
the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1185 (2003).
THE
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two crucial questions should be answered: (1) can advocates use disability
rights laws as agents of systemic educational reform?; and (2) should they?
The effort to leverage disability rights laws for school reform is rooted
in groundbreaking research on Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs).5
ACEs refer to specific categories of adversity—physical and emotional
abuse, neglect, and household dysfunction—that are strongly correlated
with poor long-term health outcomes.6 While ACEs are quite common
and transcend socio-economic status, children raised in communities of
poverty are more likely to be exposed to multiple and persistent ACEs,
including food insecurity, lack of stable housing, and community
violence.7 New research exploring ACEs links these experiences to wideranging challenges that impede a student’s ability to learn, including
difficulty regulating emotions, outsized anxiety or fear, and delayed
executive functioning skills.8
Public education advocates are creatively weaving this research into
legal claims for systemic educational reform. Relying on ACEs research,
they argue that children from impoverished and crime-ridden
neighborhoods are individuals with disabilities due to the impacts of
chronic poverty and community violence.9 As such, they argue these
students should be entitled to supports and accommodations that ensure
equal access to education.10 More specifically, they argue that disability
rights laws require public schools in these communities to make systemic
programmatic changes to address the disability-related needs of these

5. See, e.g., Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction
to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study,
14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245 (1998).
6. Id.
7. CHILD TRENDS, ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES (Mar. 7, 2019), [hereinafter CHILD
TRENDS] https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/adverse-experiences [https://perma.cc/Y7QBJW3E] (analyzing data from the National Survey of Children’s Health 2011–2016, and concluding
that “[p]oor children and near-poor children are more than twice as likely than [sic] their more affluent
peers to have had three of more other adverse experiences”); see also Gary W. Evans & Pilyoung
Kim, Childhood Poverty, Chronic Stress, Self-Regulation, and Coping, 7 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 43–48
(2013) (discussing how children growing up in poverty are more likely to “experience a greater array
of physical and psychosocial stressors,” including family conflict and turmoil and exposure to
violence).
8. Ron Hertel & Mona M. Johnson, How the Traumatic Experiences of Students Manifest in School
Settings, in SUPPORTING AND EDUCATING TRAUMATIZED STUDENTS: A GUIDE FOR SCHOOL-BASED
PROFESSIONALS 23–47 (Eric Rossen & Robert Hull eds., 2013).
9. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian
Educ., (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-08004-SPL) [hereinafter Stephen C. Complaint]; Class
Action Complaint, P.P. v. Compton Unified School Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal May, 18,
2015) (No. LA CV15 3726 MWF (PLAX)) [hereinafter P.P. Complaint].
10. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, at 12; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 72.
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students.11 These include changes to curriculum (teaching socialemotional learning skills), discipline (developing non-punitive restorative
justice practices), and mental health support (offering access to schoolbased counseling).12
While these specific programmatic reforms may be both effective and
grounded in evidence-based practices, it is far from clear that disability
law requires these changes. Moreover, expanding disability categories to
include entire communities of children creates the potential for other
societal harms. In other words, disability rights statutes may not be the
correct salve for these particular wounds.
No court has yet determined whether exposure to ACEs, or the
likelihood of such exposure, qualifies as a bona fide disability under any
of the disability rights statutes: the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504),
or Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).13 At the core of
each law is the right to supports—special education, accommodations,
and other related services—when necessary to ensure that children with
disabilities have access to the same curricula as their non-disabled peers.14
The trouble with the new litigation strategy is that while children impacted
by ACEs could theoretically access protections under all three laws, their
ability to do so will solely depend on individual experience with ACEs
and resulting needs.15
Demonstrating a class claim based on exposure to ACEs is precarious
at best because of the individualized nature of impacted children’s
experiences and needs.16 First, all three laws situate both students’ rights
and schools’ obligations in the context of an individual child, not groups
of children.17 The IDEA, for instance, restricts eligibility to thirteen
categories of disability and requires a child to demonstrate that the
disability adversely affects his or her educational performance and results
in a need for special education services.18 While a student impacted by
ACEs could potentially fit into one of the IDEA’s disability categories,
11. See, e.g., Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 3–13; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 4; 61–
71, 192–223.
12. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 62–64.
13. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2018);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101–12213.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
15. See infra section II.B.
16. See infra section II.B.
17. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019) (Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)); id. § 300.320
(defining the Individualized Education Program (IEP)).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (defining children’s disabilities)
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many students suffering from the effects of ACEs will likely need mental
health supports, but not necessarily special education services.19 Without
a need for specialized instruction, the IDEA becomes inaccessible to
students impacted by ACEs. Section 504 and the ADA present similar,
albeit distinct, problems.
Section 504 and the ADA define disability in much broader terms.20
Those broader terms could make individual students impacted by ACEs
eligible for legal protections. Yet, leveraging these laws for systemic relief
is tenuous. The most a class can claim is probable exposure to ACEs.21
But Section 504 and the ADA—just like the IDEA—require
individualized eligibility determinations before schools are obligated to
provide special education or other supports.22 Crucially, knowledge that a
child lives in chronic poverty and has exposure to ACEs does not, alone,
trigger a right to special education services or accommodations under
either law.23
Second, these class action claims make false assumptions about
schools’ affirmative duties to identify students suspected of having
disabilities. While disability law requires schools to affirmatively seek out
children suspected of having a disability and in need of special
education—known as “child find” obligations—schools are simply not
obligated to identify all children with disabilities in all cases.24 Rather,
child find obligations are limited to identifying a subset of students with
disabilities—those whose disabilities impact their education and require
special education, accommodations, or other related services.25 In other
words, schools have no obligation to seek out students with disabilities for
census purposes alone—to simply document how many exist.26 This

19. CTR. ON DEVELOPING CHILD, HARVARD UNIV., FROM BEST PRACTICES TO BREAKTHROUGH
IMPACTS: A SCIENCE-BASED APPROACH TO BUILDING A MORE PROMISING FUTURE FOR YOUNG
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (2016), https://46y5eh11fhgw3ve3ytpwxt9r-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/From_Best_Practices_to_Breakthrough_Impacts-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AR9L-KSP8].
20. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
21. See infra Part III.
22. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35 (discussing evaluation and placement); see also Protecting Students with Disabilities:
Frequently Asked Questions About Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC.: OFFICE C.R.., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html [https://perma.cc/V5RD-2ZUD]
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS] (FAQ # 34).
23. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35. Instead, disability rights laws require individualized assessments to
determine whether a disability exists and what, if any, special education or related services are
required to ensure meaningful access to education.
24. See infra section III.A.
25. See infra section III.A.2.
26. See infra section III.A.2.
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presents a problem for a plaintiff’s ACEs theory.27 Not all children
exposed to trauma will experience the same effects.28 A school can be
aware of the potential impacts of ACEs on child development, learning,
and behavior, but that awareness does not necessarily trigger an obligation
to begin the eligibility process in all cases. And it certainly does not—
without evaluation—immediately trigger the obligation to provide
accommodations, special education, or related services.29
Third, these cases conflate an obligation to identify students with
disabilities with the obligation to provide affirmative education services
and supports. The duty to identify students, as contained in child find, is
universal; it applies to all students suspected of having disabilities that
require special education or related services.30 But, the duty to provide
affirmative services to ensure a Free Appropriate Public Education
(FAPE) is an individual right.31 FAPE is rooted in an individual child’s
right to an educational program designed to meet their needs as adequately
as their non-disabled peers.32
Class claims demanding system-wide changes in educational services
have the power to effectively alter education for all students.33 By
definition, systemic reforms that change the delivery of education for all
children are not tied to an individual student’s needs, but rather are driven
by the group’s collective needs.34 While the group may, in fact, require
27. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 306–18; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 201–07
(discussing plaintiffs’ theory that school districts are liable under Section 504 for their failure to
identify students experiencing ACEs as students with disabilities).
28. About
ACEs,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childabuseandneglect/acestudy/aboutace.html
[https://perma.cc/WMA5-PV2V] (“The presence of ACEs does not mean that a child will experience
poor outcomes. However, children’s positive experiences or protective factors can prevent children
from experiencing adversity and can protect against many of the negative health and life outcomes
even after adversity has occurred.”).
29. See infra section III.A.3.
30. Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32(a), 104.35(a) (2019).
31. Id. § 104.33.
32. Id. § 104.33(b)–(c). In order to satisfy Section 504’s FAPE requirement, a school must comply
with evaluation and placement requirements, afford procedural safeguards, and inform students’
parents or guardians of those safeguards. Id. § 104.35(a) (evaluation and placement); Id. § 104.36
(procedural safeguards).
33. Likely the most famous class-based claim in the context of education reform is Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate but equal educational facilities for racial
minorities is inherently unequal, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
34. Systemic
Reform,
GLOSSARY
EDUC.
REFORM
(Aug.
29,
2013),
https://www.edglossary.org/systemic-reform/ [https://perma.cc/WT8Z-X2GP] (“[T]he concept of
systemic reform may be used in reference to (1) reforms that impact multiple levels of the education
system, such as elementary, middle, and high school programs; (2) reforms that aspire to make
changes throughout a defined system, such as district-wide or statewide reforms; (3) reforms that are
intended to influence, in minor or significant ways, every student and staff member in school or
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and benefit from these curricular changes, the FAPE standard—and thus
disability rights law—does not compel them.
Relatedly, by demanding system-wide relief, these lawsuits stretch the
purpose of disability law, and by doing so, risk over-inclusion. Although
the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA have brought about sweeping
changes for students with disabilities, over time, none of these laws were
enacted to facilitate school-wide curricular remedies.35 Moreover, schoolwide remedies would capture both students who need these additional
supports as well as students who may not. While this may be an efficient
way to address the broader impacts of ACEs, the law only requires
remedies targeted at individual student needs.36
Finally, broadening disability eligibility to include mere exposure to
ACEs can have the unintended consequence of unfairly stigmatizing
impoverished minority children as impaired.37 While ACEs cut across
socio-economic classes, certain individuals are at higher risk for exposure
to ACEs.38 Children at or near the poverty level are more than twice as
likely as affluent children to experience a statistically significant number
of ACEs.39 Because children in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty
and violence have greater obvious exposure to ACEs, entire
neighborhoods of children could be classified as disabled.40 Of course,
students with disabilities do not deserve the stigma sometimes associated
with disability. And while society has come a long way in its general
understanding and respect for persons with disabilities, barriers to

system; or (4) reforms that may vary widely in design and purpose, but that nevertheless reflect a
consistent educational philosophy or that are aimed at achieving common objectives.”).
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012) (short title; findings; purposes); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)
(nondiscrimination under federal grants and programs); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309–13 (1988);
Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases, 16 TEX. J. ON
C.L. & C.R. 1 (2010); U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS, supra note 22 (“Section 504 is a federal law designed
to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities in programs and activities that receive Federal
financial assistance from the U.S. Department of Education.”).
36. See infra section III.B.
37. See infra section III.D.
38. Melissa T. Merrick et al., Prevalence of Adverse Childhood Experiences from 2011–2014
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System in 23 States, 172 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1038, 1038 (2018)
(finding that “participants who identified as black, Hispanic, or multiracial, those with less than a high
school education, those with annual income less than $15,000, those who were unemployed or unable
to work, and those identifying as gay/lesbian or bisexual reported significantly higher exposure to
[ACEs] than comparison groups”).
39. CHILD TRENDS, supra note 7 (“Poor children and near-poor children are more than twice as
likely than their more affluent peers to have had three or more other adverse experiences.”).
40. For example, the plaintiffs in the P.P. case alleged that all children in Compton should be
considered individuals with disabilities under Section 504. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 58.
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acceptance still remain.41 Certainly, ensuring students receive the supports
they need to succeed is beyond reproach. But assuming all children, by
virtue of growing up in a certain community, are in need of special
education or accommodations is stigmatizing and can have long-term
negative consequences on how these students view themselves and are
viewed by others.42
The foregoing critiques are hard ones to lodge. Children from
struggling communities plagued by drug epidemics, marred by violence,
and devoid of economic development are, undoubtedly, negatively
impacted by those environments.43 These children can struggle to manage
stress and regulate emotions, thereby limiting their chances of educational
success.44 Advocates’ new claims shine a much-needed spotlight on the
breadth and immediacy of this problem. Their efforts underscore the fact
that community wide challenges require large-scale fixes. This Article
echoes all these concerns, even if it raises questions about whether and
how disability law provides a remedy. The solution, however, is not to fit
a square peg into a round hole.
The solution is to fill the gap in existing laws and remedies that this
Article’s critique reveals. First, rather than leveraging disability rights laws
for sweeping programmatic changes, advocates should leverage the laws’
child find mandate in individual cases where students are clearly evidencing
learning or behavioral challenges. Methodically bringing a series of child
find claims would pressure schools to enhance their screening tools.
Enhanced screening tools would, in turn, improve early identification of
ACEs-impacted students.45 Advocates could demand comprehensive
evaluations for these individual students followed by individualized
education plans aimed at remediating the effects of ACEs. In short, rather
than assuming all children have a disability, this strategy forces schools to
identify those who do earlier. Moreover, if aggregate results reveal that a
critical mass of individual students could benefit from the same supports,
such as mental health counseling and social emotional skills training, a
school could elect to offer such changes school-wide. This is the very
remedy the current lawsuits seek. But this choice would be based on the
41. Brian East, Struggling to Fulfill Its Promise: The ADA at 15, 68 TEX. B.J. 614, 615 (2005)
(arguing that judicial opposition exists toward the ADA preventing disabled individuals from reaping
its intended benefits).
42. See infra section III.D.
43. Evans & Kim, supra note 7, at 44 (discussing how children growing up in poverty are more
likely to “experience a greater array of physical and psychosocial stressors” including family conflict
and turmoil and exposure to violence).
44. Nadine J. Burke et al., The Impact of Adverse Childhood Experiences on an Urban Pediatric
Population, 35 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 408 (2011).
45. See infra section IV.G.
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school’s response to individualized data gathered on their student
population, not on broad assumptions based on community characteristics.
Second, federal and state legislators should create targeted grants that
direct funding to schools serving large populations of students impacted
by ACEs.46 School districts could apply for funding upon a showing that
a threshold percentage of their student population was exposed to a
statistically significant number of ACEs.47 This funding could be used to
implement trauma-informed training for teachers and school officials,
mental health counseling for students, and other evidence-based
interventions that have proven effective in addressing the impacts of
ACEs. The availability of these grants would incentivize school districts
to be proactive in identifying and serving students impacted by ACEs. 48
They would also facilitate a grassroots approach, encouraging
communities to identify their particular needs and the resources that
would best meet those needs.
Critics may argue that children facing the immediate challenges of high
crime and poverty cannot wait for Congress to act or for schools to choose
to address their needs. And they are right—these children need relief now.
But disability laws can pressure school districts to address at least some
of their educational needs without distorting the overall legal framework.
Stretching the laws beyond their bounds is just as likely to undermine
support and enforcement of the laws as it is to secure the remedies
plaintiffs seek. The IDEA, for instance, already provides far fewer
resources than schools need and is routinely charged as being overly
burdensome.49 The better approach is to continue to fight for ACEsimpacted children through provisions that grant established individualized
remedies for such students, such as comprehensive evaluations to address
individualized needs, and pursue congressional action for systemic
remedies that are not currently available. Proceeding with this more
measured approach will help guard against the dangers of over-inclusion.

46. See infra section IV.H.
47. Felitti et al., supra note 5 (demonstrating an increased chance of negative health outcomes when
four or more ACEs are identified).
48. While over-identification of children with disabilities is always a concern, this solution
mitigates against that problem because funding flows from exposure to a statistically significant
number of risk factors. It is not tied to disability category or eligibility as an “individual with a
disability.” See infra section IV.B.
49. See generally Miriam Kurtzig Freedman, Special Education: Its Ethical Dilemmas, Entitlement
Status, and Suggested Systemic Reform, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that the IDEA as written
has outlived its purpose and instead created many unintended consequences including an increase in
children eligible under the IDEA and thus an increased cost to educating these students, and stressful
procedural demands that take teachers out of classrooms and away from teaching).
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In 1998, a groundbreaking study from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and Kaiser Permanente shifted the way the
scientific community conceptualized adult physical and mental health by
identifying a correlation between ACEs and poor adult health outcomes.50
Since then several studies have further explored the impacts of adverse
childhood experiences on adult health outcomes, as well as child physical
and mental health.51 An expanding body of research now supports the
theory that ACEs can disrupt healthy brain development with significant
implications for learning, behavior, and health.52
1.

ACEs Defined

The original ACEs study consisted of nine categories: emotional abuse,
physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional and physical neglect, household
substance abuse, household mental illness, parental separation or divorce,
household domestic violence, and incarcerated household member.53
Additional adverse factors have been added to the original study,
including death of a parent, community violence, and poverty.54 While
some stress in life is normal and can even promote healthy development,
the type of stress that results when a child experiences ACEs may become
destructive when there is “strong, frequent, or prolonged activation of the
body’s stress response systems in the absence of the buffering protection
50. See generally Felitti et al., supra note 5.
51. Marilyn Metzler et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and Life Opportunities: Shifting the
Narrative, 72 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 141, 147 (2016); see also E. Jane Costello et al., The
Prevalence of Potentially Traumatic Events in Childhood and Adolescence, 15 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS
99, 107 (2002); Araceli Gonzalez et al., Trauma Exposure in Elementary School Children:
Description of Screening Procedures, Level of Exposure, and Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms, 8 SCH.
MENTAL HEALTH 77, 83 (2016); Johanna K.P. Greeson et al., Traumatic Childhood Experiences in
the 21st Century: Broadening and Building on the ACE Studies with Data from the National Child
Traumatic Stress Network, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 536, 548–50 (2014); Violence
Prevention: Risk and Protective Factors, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 27, 2019),
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/youthviolence/riskprotectivefactors.html
[https://perma.cc/EC3J-LML2].
52. Laura J. Hickman et al., How Much Does “How Much” Matter?: Assessing the Relationship
Between Children’s Lifetime Exposure to Violence and Trauma Symptoms, Behavior Problems, and
Parenting Stress, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1338, 1341, 1355–56 (2012); Jack P. Shonkoff et
al., The Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adversity and Toxic Stress, 129 PEDIATRICS e232, e237
(2012), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/129/1/e232.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GQ8X-AV3H].
53. Felitti et al., supra note 5, at 248.
54. Metzler et al., supra note 51, at 142.
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of a supportive, adult relationship.”55 Scientists categorize this type of
stress as “toxic” because it can lead to long-term impairment and can
actually disrupt the development of brain architecture and other organ
systems.56 Studies have demonstrated a “dose-response” relationship
between a person’s number of ACEs and resulting psychological and
physical conditions.57 The original ACEs study evidenced that adults who
identified more than four ACE categories were more likely to suffer from
various chronic diseases than adults with zero ACEs.58
The fact that a child has experienced one of the categories of ACEs
does not automatically indicate that the child will experience long-term
negative impacts on health or development.59 Children, like adults, vary
in their capacity to develop resiliency. Some will surely develop internal
and external resources to manage these negative experiences.60 ACEs
become problematic when a child lacks the tools to overcome them.
Moreover, as the following discussion illuminates, the more ACEs
children encounter, the more likely they are to experience toxic stress and
the corresponding negative impacts on health and development.
Before moving on, it is helpful to clarify terminology used to describe
the impact of exposure to multiple or persistent ACEs. The term “toxic
stress” is used to describe the point at which ACEs begin to negatively
impact physical and emotional health.61 The term “complex trauma” is
also generally used to describe exposure to multiple traumatic events and

55. Shonkoff et al., supra note 52, at e236.
56. Id. “[T]he National Scientific Council on the Developing Child coined the term ‘toxic stress’
to describe extensive, scientific knowledge about the effects of excessive activation of stress response
systems on a child’s developing brain, as well as the immune system, metabolic regulatory systems,
and cardiovascular system.” ACEs and Toxic Stress: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. ON THE
DEVELOPING CHILD: HARV. U., https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/aces-and-toxic-stressfrequently-asked-questions/#ACEs [https://perma.cc/HJD9-FE6C].
57. Felitti et al., supra note 5, at 250.
58. Id. Subsequent studies have shown that adults endorsing more than 4 ACEs are 2.6 times as
likely to have Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), hepatitis (2.4 times as likely),
sexually transmitted infections (2.5) and injection drug use (4.6). Id. at 245.
59. Violence
Prevention,
CTRS.
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childabuseandneglect/acestudy/aboutace.html
[https://perma.cc/B3UV-EW6J] (“The presence of ACEs does not mean that a child will experience
poor outcomes. However, children’s positive experiences or protective factors can prevent children
from experiencing adversity and can protect against many of the negative health and life outcomes
even after adversity has occurred.”).
60. Id.; see also Cathryn Delude, Scars That Don’t Fade, PROTO (Dec. 23, 2015),
http://protomag.com/articles/scars-that-dont-fade [https://perma.cc/47RP-HS2M] (discussing how
researchers are trying to understand “the mechanisms that enable some children to handle stress even
when it becomes chronic”).
61. Shonkoff et al., supra note 52, at e236.
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the resulting symptoms, which can be both physical and psychological.62
Complex trauma is sometimes used to describe exposure of four or more
ACEs.63 This Article will use both “complex trauma” and “toxic stress”
to mean exposure to multiple or persistent ACEs that has resulted in
negative physical or psychological symptoms.
2.

ACEs and Child Development

Numerous studies have demonstrated the impacts toxic stress can have
on both physical and mental health for children.64 Beginning as early as
the prenatal period, fetal exposure to maternal stress can influence later
stress responsiveness.65 Persistently elevated levels of stress hormones
can actually change the physical development of the brain which can
impact several important physiological and cognitive functions.66 For
instance, exposure to stressful experiences has been shown to influence
attention, memory, learning, and executive functioning (the umbrella term
to describe skills needed for self-regulation and mental control).67
Consequently, when a child grows up under constant or extreme stress,
the body’s stress-response systems may not develop normally.
A child experiencing multiple or persistent ACEs may have an altered
baseline state of cognitive arousal.68 Thus, even when there is no external
threat, the child is physiologically experiencing a state of fight or flight.69
When this child encounters even ordinary levels of stress, the child may
automatically respond as if under extreme stress.70 For example, the child
may experience rapid breathing or heart pounding, or may completely

62. ALEXANDRA COOK ET AL., NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK COMPLEX TRAUMA
TASK FORCE, COMPLEX TRAUMA IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 5 (2003).
63. David Dante Troutt, Trapped in Tragedies: Childhood Trauma, Spatial Inequality, and Law,
101 MARQ. L. REV. 601, 610 (2018); Effects, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK
[hereinafter Effects], https://www.nctsn.org/what-is-child-trauma/trauma-types/complextrauma/effects [https://perma.cc/BUY9-JGLA].
64. Gonzalez et al., supra note 51, at 83; Metzler et al., supra note 51, at 141–42 (citing to several
studies within this paper); Bruce D. Perry & Ronnie Pollard, Homeostasis, Stress, Trauma, and
Adaptation: A Neurodevelopmental View of Childhood Trauma, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 33, 33–51 (1998).
65. See Shonkoff et al., supra note 52.
66. Id. at e236.
67. Id.
68. Perry & Pollard, supra note 64, at 33–51 (“Simply stated, the child is in a persisting fear
‘state.’ . . . the child’s new basal homeostatic or equilibrium emotional state is a state of anxiety.”);
see also Delude, supra note 60 (discussing how “stress can become a chronic irritant” when the stressresponse system is repeatedly activated or fails to turn off).
69. Perry & Pollard, supra note 64, at 33–51.
70. Id. at 33–51 (“Everyday stresses that previously may not have elicited any response are now
able to elicit an exaggerated reactivity in children who are hyperreactive and overly sensitive.”).
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shut down.71 These responses are out of proportion to the level of stress
encountered and can be perceived as “‘overreacting,’ or as unresponsive
or detached.”72
The adaptive responses that help the child survive and cope in a chaotic
and unpredictable home environment often put the child at a disadvantage
in the educational setting. When a stressor arises—for example an argument
with a peer or demanding school task—an ACEs-impacted child can
escalate to a state of fear very quickly. As one researcher aptly described,
“[a] child with a brain adapted for an environment of chaos,
unpredictability, threat, and distress is ill-suited to the modern classroom or
playground.”73 Thus, it will come as no surprise to learn that children coping
with toxic stress have lower academic achievement, higher instances of
behavioral problems, and are more likely to drop out of school altogether.74
Quite obviously, such outsized reactions to stress can inhibit a child’s
ability to successfully engage in school and navigate relationships with
both teachers and peers. Children impacted by toxic stress are more likely
to experience both academic failure and behavioral challenges in school.
One study found that children who have experienced three or more ACEs
faced the following consequences: they were four times more likely to
experience academic failure, five times more likely to have serious
attendance problems, and six times more likely to incur serious school
behavior problems.75 As a result of the growing influence of ACEs
research, many schools have begun to turn their attention towards
adopting trauma-informed practices.76 Schools are beginning to realize
that a majority of their student populations have encountered at least one

71. Id. (discussing the effects of repeated exposure to childhood trauma including: hyperactivity,
anxiety, behavioral impulsivity, rapid heart rate, and “freezing”).
72. Effects, supra note 63.
73. Bruce D. Perry, Maltreatment and the Developing Child: How Early Childhood Experience
Shapes Child and Culture, CTR. CHILD. & FAM. JUST. SYS. 2–3 (Sept. 23, 2004),
http://www.lfcc.on.ca/mccain/perry.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB4N-BDQS] (“Compared to their peers,
therefore, traumatized children may have less capacity to tolerate the normal demands and stresses of
school, home, and social life.”).
74. Hertel & Johnson, supra note 8; AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, CHRONIC STRESS AND THE RISK OF
HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT, 3–5 (2018), https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/sbhc/chronic_stress.
ashx?la=en&hash=F5FB7AF535D2CDA4CBC81236DBCE6580B53607E4 [https://perma.cc/PSP9MVBE]; Christopher M. Layne et al., Cumulative Trauma Exposure and High Risk Behavior in
Adolescence: Findings from the National Child Traumatic Stress Network Core Data Set, 6 PSYCHOL.
TRAUMA: THEORY, RES. PRAC. POL’Y S40, S42, S45 (2014).
75. CHRISTOPHER BLODGETT, NO SCHOOL ALONE: HOW COMMUNITY RISKS AND ASSETS
CONTRIBUTE TO SCHOOL AND YOUTH SUCCESS 25 (2015), https://traumasensitiveschools.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/no_school_alone-Washington-State.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7H8-LZXJ].
76. 6 Ways to Become a Trauma-Informed School, NAT’L RESILIENCE INST. (May 17, 2017),
https://nationalresilienceinstitute.org/2017/05/6-ways-become-trauma-informed-school/
[https://perma.cc/8GR3-22H5].
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ACE.77 Further, as the following section describes, public schools
comprised of a majority of students from impoverished communities may
find much higher incidences of students impacted by toxic stress.
3.

ACEs and Chronically Impoverished Communities

ACEs occur regularly with children across race, socio-economic class,
and geographic regions, but children living in poverty are at higher risk
for more ACEs.78 The more ACEs a child experiences, the more likely
they are to have negative physical or psychological symptoms.79 Results
of nationally collected data demonstrate that “poor children . . . are more
than twice as likely than their more affluent peers to have had three or
more adverse experiences.”80 Just as with adults, children experiencing
multiple ACEs evidence an increased risk for poor outcomes.81 Children
with two or more ACEs were nearly three times more likely to repeat a
grade in school, compared to children without any ACEs.82 Children with
four or more ACEs were significantly more likely to have learning or
behavior problems than children reporting zero ACEs.83
Research clearly demonstrates that while ACEs are present in children
nationwide, children in poverty are disproportionately exposed to more
trauma-inducing events.84 Moreover, studies indicate a correlation between
children raised in communities of chronic poverty and depressed cognitive

77. Responding to Trauma in K-12 Schools, NAT’L CTR. ON SAFE SUPPORTIVE LEARNING ENV’TS,
https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/responding-trauma-k-12-schools
[https://perma.cc/S3ZNDSQB].
78. CHILD TRENDS, supra note 7; see also Neal Halfon et. al., Income Inequality and the
Differential Effect of Adverse Childhood Experiences in US Children, 17 ACADEMIC PEDIATRICS 7S
(Sept.–Oct. 2017).
79. Burke et al., supra note 44, at 411; see also Christina D. Bethell et al., Adverse Childhood
Experiences: Assessing the Impact on Health and School Engagement and the Mitigating Role of
Resilience, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2106, 2109 (2014) (conducting a nationwide study finding that 48%
of U.S. children have had at least one ACE); Matthew Kliethermes et al., Complex Trauma, 23 CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 339, 341 (2014).
80. CHILD TRENDS, supra note 7, at 158.
81. Burke et al., supra note 44.
82. Bethell et al., supra note 79, at 2110. The effect remained even after adjusting for demographic
and health status factors.
83. Three percent of participants with an ACE score of zero had learning/behavior problems, while
51.2% of participants with an ACE score of four or more displayed learning/behavior problems. Burke
et al., supra note 44.
84. Troutt, supra note 63, at 614; see also Nat’l Sci. Council on the Developing Child, Persistent Fear and
Anxiety Can Affect Young Children’s Learning and Development 8 (Center on the Developing Child, Harv. Univ.,
Working Paper No. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Persistent Fear], https://46y5eh11fhgw3ve3ytpwxt9r-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Persistent-Fear-and-Anxiety-Can-Affect-Young-Childrens-Learning-andDevelopment.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4UB-EECJ].
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development.85 Several potential causes exist, including poor nutrition,
prenatal substance abuse, and increased exposure to toxins.86 In addition,
poor children tend to be raised in homes with less cognitive stimulation
(fewer books, educational toys, and opportunities for educational
experiences).87 While science has yet to establish a causal effect between
poverty and cognitive deficits, a number of studies have established that
environment and experience can impact cognitive development.88
Children living in neighborhoods of concentrated and chronic poverty
are at higher risk for experiencing toxic stress because their risk of
exposure to traumatic events is increased.89 One example is an increased
risk of exposure to community violence. While violence is certainly not
present in all low-income communities, nor is it limited to such
communities, isolated communities battling chronic poverty also struggle
with higher incidence of violence.90 Several studies have evidenced the
many negative impacts resulting from youth exposure to community
violence, including the following: posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
anxiety, depression, and dissociation, as well as lower capacity for
empathy, and diminished self-esteem.91 One study found that “[y]outh
exposed to violence have decreased social competence and increased rates
of peer rejection, as well as decreased IQ and reading ability, lower gradepoint average (GPA), more days of school absence, and decreased rates
of high school graduation.”92
Recently, two separate class-action lawsuits have attempted to leverage
this research to claim children growing up in impoverished and violent
communities should be considered disabled within the meaning of disability
85. Martha J. Farah et al., Poverty, Privilege, and Brain Development: Empirical Findings and
Ethical Implications, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY
(Judy Illes ed., 2004); see, e.g., Richard Monasterksy, Researchers Probe How Poverty Harms
Children’s Brains, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 29, 2008, (describing new research attempting to
identify the environmental factors associated with living in poverty that have a negative effect on
cognitive development).
86. James E. Ryan, Poverty as Disability and the Future of Special Education Law, 101 GEO. L.J.
1455, 1483 (2013).
87. Id.
88. Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCI. 976 (2013).
89. Corina Graif et al., Urban Poverty and Neighborhood Effects on Crime: Incorporating Spatial
and Network Perspectives, 8 SOC. COMPASS 1140 (2014); see also Matthew R. Lee, Concentrated
Poverty, Race and Homicide, 41 SOC. Q. 189 (2000).
90. Graif et al., supra note 89; see also Lee, supra note 89.
91. Eugene Aisenberg & Ferol E. Mennen, Children Exposed to Community Violence: Issues for
Assessment and Treatment, 17 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 341, 344 (2000); Sheryl Kataoka
et al., Effects on School Outcomes in Low-Income Minority Youth: Preliminary Findings from a
Community-Partnered Study of a School Trauma Intervention, 21 ETHNICITY & DISEASE S1-71, S171 (2011); Jeff Grogger, Local Violence, Educational Attainment, and Teacher Pay (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6003, 1997).
92. Kataoka et al., supra note 91.
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rights laws.93 In seeking eligibility as students with disabilities under these
laws, the suits aimed to access the concomitant rights to special education
and related supports and services.94 The following sections will provide an
overview of relevant disability rights laws and then walk through the legal
theories that weave ACEs and disability laws together into class action
litigation seeking broad-based educational reforms.
B.

The Laws: An Overview of Disability Rights Laws

Three laws govern the education of students with disabilities in public
schools: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),95 Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,96 and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).97 While the laws certainly interact with each
other, there are some distinct differences. The IDEA applies only to
children and creates the most affirmative rights for students with
disabilities in schools.98 Section 504 and the ADA are broader antidiscrimination laws that protect all qualifying individuals with disabilities
in a variety of public settings, including public schools.99 Section 504 and
the ADA are often thought of as protecting negative rights, since they
promise the right to be free from discrimination; but they, too, contain
important affirmative rights for students with disabilities including the
right to accommodations and special education when necessary to ensure
equal access to education.100 The following section will briefly describe
each law and explain how a student becomes eligible for statutory
protections under each.
1.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The IDEA operates much like a contract in which the federal government
promises funding to schools who agree to abide by the law’s proscriptions

93. Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. CV-17-08004-PCT-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018); P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
94. Id.
95. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (2012).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485; see generally LAURA ROTHSTEIN & SCOTT F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW (4th ed. 2010).
99. See generally ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 287–99. Section 504 and the ADA are
similar in terms of eligibility for protections, but the ADA is much more expansive in that it does not
only reach recipients of federal funding.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12182; 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019).
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regarding the treatment of students with disabilities.101 In order to be
eligible for IDEA services, a child must meet the statute’s definition of a
“child with a disability”—meaning the child must fall into one of the
thirteen recognized categories of disability, the disability must adversely
impact education, and the child must need special education and related
services as a result.102 The IDEA’s disability categories are legal, not
medical, definitions of disability and they are not without controversy.103
The IDEA’s purpose is to ensure that all children with disabilities receive
special education and related services designed to meet their “unique”
needs.104 Once a child meets the statutory definition of a “child with a
disability,” they are entitled to a Free Appropriate Public Education
(FAPE).105 The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean an
“individualized education program” (IEP) reasonably calculated to enable
a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.106
IDEA eligible students also have a right to education in the least restrictive
environment as well as a number of due process rights.107
The law also obligates schools to affirmatively seek out children
suspected of having a disability and in need of special education.108 This
obligation is known as child find and is quite expansive.109 Schools
typically fulfill this obligation by enacting policies to help screen all

101. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (federal statute governing the rights of eligible students
with disabilities in schools).
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8.
103. See Mark Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFFALO L. REV. 83, 91–92, 122–52 (2009).
Intellectual disability, emotional disturbance, and specific learning disability are subjectively
measured and thus, prone to bias on the part of evaluators, as evidenced by the over-representation of
minority children who make up these categories. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA: Shifting
Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071
(2005); see also Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995
WIS. L. REV. 1237 (1995). If, by virtue of eligibility for special education services, students improved
their educational outcomes, such over-representation would warrant minimal concern. Unfortunately,
data illustrates that students with special education needs (and particularly students receiving services
under the category of emotional disturbance) achieve markedly less educational success. SHARON
VAUGHN ET AL., DEEPER LEARNING FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 3 (2015),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED560790.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD3L-9YRM] (“According to the
most recent [National Assessment of Educational Progress] (NCES 2013), 38−45 percent of students
without disabilities performed at the proficient level or above in reading and mathematics in fourth
and eighth grade, while a mere 8−17 percent of students with disabilities did so . . . .”).
104. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (purposes).
105. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9) (FAPE definition); § 1401(3) (child with a disability).
106. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 991
(2017).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (least restrictive environment); Id. § 1415 (procedural safeguards).
108. Id. § 1412(a)(3).
109. Id.
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students for any deviations from normal child development.110 The results
of such screenings may indicate a problem that warrants further
investigation.111 When this happens, the IDEA demands individualized
comprehensive assessments to determine whether a child qualifies for
services under the statute and, if so, the particular services and supports
needed to progress in school.112 Courts have not reached a clear consensus
regarding when a school will be held liable for failure to timely identify a
child with a disability.113 Some courts hold schools liable for child find
violations when they “overlook[] ‘clear signs of disability’ . . . [were]
‘negligent in failing to order testing,’” or when there appears to be “no
rational justification for not deciding to evaluate.”114
The IDEA clearly provides important substantive and procedural
protections for students who meet the law’s definition of a “child with a
disability.” The likelihood that a child impacted by ACEs will be able to
meet this definition will largely be dependent on the individual child’s
circumstances.115
2.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act

In contrast to the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA offer broader
coverage as they apply to all individuals, not just students, who meet the
statutes’ relevant definitions of disability and because that definition itself
is expansive.116 Section 504 was the first federal statute to prohibit
discrimination against the disabled, stating, “[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving

110. Typical screenings include hearing and vision screens. State-wide achievement tests can also
be used to screen for deviations from the average. ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 86.
111. Id.
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Importantly, these evaluations must use a variety of
assessment tools and cannot rely on one single measure, such as a child’s full-scale intelligent
quotient, to determine eligibility for special education. Id. § 1414(b)(2)(B).
113. Perry A. Zirkel, Child Find: The “Reasonable Period” Requirement, 311 EDUC. L. REP. 576,
577–78 (2015) (discussing varying courts’ approaches to determining when a school has complied
with evaluation of the child within a “reasonable period”).
114. Demarcus L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 13 C 5331, 2014 WL 948883, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
11, 2014) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also
D.G. v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 481 F. App’x 887 (5th Cir. 2012); Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. Brown,
769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 942−43 (E.D. Va. 2010); Perry A. Zirkel, “Child Find”: The Lore v. The Law,
307 EDUC. L. REP. 574 (2014).
115. Eligibility for such a child is discussed further in section II.B.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012).
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Federal financial assistance . . . .”117 Despite this broad language, Section
504 was largely unenforced and thus, proved ineffective at eradicating
disability discrimination.118 In response, the ADA was enacted in 1990 to
“provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”119 Title II of the
ADA was based in large part on Section 504, with Title II regulations
patterned after Section 504 regulations.120 Both operate as
nondiscrimination statutes and bar organizations from discriminating
against persons with disabilities for reasons related to their disabilities.121
Section 504 is limited to any program or activity receiving federal funds
and Title II extends this prohibition to all public organizations.122 Thus,
both statutes apply to public schools.
In addition, both laws define disability as (1) “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities”; (2) having “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) “being
regarded as having such an impairment.”123 To clarify and expand the
law’s definition of disability, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act
of 2008.124 The expanded definition applies equally to Section 504.125

117. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
118. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP.
L. REV. 393, 394, 416 (1991) (“In the ADA, Congress determined, as apparently did the Executive,
that section 504 simply was not working as a means of eradicating discrimination and segregation in
this country. Congress found that, even though section 504 had been the law for seventeen years,
‘society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem.’”).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012); see also Nancy L. Jones, Overview and Essential
Requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 479 (1991).
120. The regulations under Section 504 and the ADA must be “consistent” with each other. 42
U.S.C. § 12134(b). Further, courts may not construe the provision of the ADA “to apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under [Section 504] or the regulations issued by Federal agencies
pursuant” to Section 504. Id. § 12201(a). Thus, courts generally apply the same analysis to both laws.
The regulations pursuant to Title II of the ADA are found at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, and the regulations
under Section 504 are found at 28 C.F.R. pt. 42 (G).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
124. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (Amendments Act), Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(2008) (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). The Amendments Act amended both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act definition of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; 154 CONG. REC. S8342, 8346
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of the Managers to Accompany S. 3406); see also RUSSLYNN
ALI, ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES ATTENDING PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Jan. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Attending Public Elementary],
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-504faq-201109.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7GJZGRNV]; Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
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Consequently, the definition of disability under Section 504 and the ADA
is substantially broader than that under the IDEA and thus, generally
speaking, a child who is eligible for services under the IDEA will usually
qualify for services under either Section 504 or Title II of the ADA.126
Both Section 504 and the ADA convey important affirmative rights to
students in public schools.127 Like the IDEA, they obligate schools to find
children with disabilities who need special education or related services
and confer FAPE.128 But, both child find and FAPE obligations differ
from those set forth in the IDEA, however.129 For instance, Section 504
defines FAPE in terms of equality of access to education.130 It ensures
access, but not outcome.131 The IDEA’s FAPE standard is not based on
equal access, but rather calibrated to each individual student’s potential,
mandating individualized education programs (IEPs) designed to ensure
progress towards highly individualized goals.132 These distinctions may
become important in determining what a school district owes a child with
a disability under each law, but courts have only recently begun to
recognize the differences.133
What is certain, however, is that children who are eligible under either
the IDEA, Section 504, or the ADA have the ability to assert their rights in
Dep’t of Educ., to Title IX Coordinators (Jan. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Dear Colleague ADA Letter],
www.ed.gov/ocr/letters/colleague-201109.html [https://perma.cc/YT4N-XWDH].
126. Weber, supra note 35, at 5–9, 19.
127. 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2019) (Procedural safeguards).
128. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32−.35; 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b).
129. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)−(b)(1). While the ADA does not address child find or FAPE
specifically, the U.S. Department of Education has interpreted the ADA’s obligations to students as
coextensive with that of Section 504. Thus, it has stated that the ADA requires a district to provide
FAPE to the same extent as is required under Section 504 in order to comply with the ADA. See Letter
from Gary D. Jackson, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, W. Div. Seattle (Washington), Issaquah (WA)
School District No. 411, to Janet Berry, Superintendent, Issaquah School District No. 411 (May 2,
2003) (on file with author); Letter from Stella B. Klugman, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, W.
Div., San Francisco (California), Pleasant Valley (CA) Elementary Sch. Dist., to James Shroyer,
Superintendent, Pleasant Valley Elementary Sch. Dist. (June 29, 1999) (on file with author); Letter
from Nicole Huggins, Deputy Chief Reg. Att’y, Office for Civil Rights, W. Div. Denver (Arizona),
Naco (AZ) Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 23, to Patricia Marsh, Superintendent, Naco Elementary Sch.
District No. 23 (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author); Letter from Janette J. Lim, Dir. of Pol’y, Enf’t,
and Program Service, Office for Civil Rights, E. Div. of Philadelphia, to Hon. Nick J. Rahall, House
of Representatives, Washington, D.C. (June 22, 1994) (on file with author).
130. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1).
131. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2008).
132. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999
(2017); see also Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
133. Mark H., 513 F.3d at 933 (“FAPE under the IDEA and FAPE as defined in the § 504
regulations are similar but not identical . . . . The most important differences are that, unlike FAPE
under the IDEA, FAPE under § 504 is defined to require a comparison between the manner in which
the needs of disabled and non-disabled children are met, and focuses on the ‘design’ of a child’s
educational program.”).
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order to ensure their access to education. In the case of the IDEA, students
with disabilities have the right to a substantive standard of education—one
that allows them reasonable progress in light of their individual capabilities.
Section 504 and the ADA give students with disabilities the right to equal
access of education, commensurate to their non-disabled peers. Further,
each law provides students with an ability to invoke these protections
through due process procedures. The laws give students with disabilities the
ability to challenge eligibility, placement, or provision of special education
or related services and thus, these students can hold schools accountable in
ways that other students cannot. The following section will explore two
recent communities that attempted to leverage disability rights laws into
agents of broad-based educational reforms.
C.

The Strategy: Combining Science and Disability Laws to Reform
Sub-Standard Schools

In two recent and innovative cases, entire communities of children
invoked disability rights laws to demand systemic reforms to the delivery
of education for all students—both disabled and non-disabled. The first
case involved children from Compton, California, and the second
involved a community of Native Americans from the Havasupai
Nation.134 Both began as class-action lawsuits claiming that children in
these communities faced numerous and persistent ACEs that impacted
their ability to succeed in school,135 and that school districts were aware
of these challenges and should have implemented accommodations and
other supportive services to address them.136 The following section will
introduce these groundbreaking cases and explore how their case theories
may dramatically re-purpose disability rights statutes into agents of
educational reform.
In 2015, a group of students and teachers who attended and taught in
the Compton School District in California filed a class-action lawsuit
alleging that the school district violated Section 504 and the ADA by
failing to timely identify and provide necessary accommodations for
students impacted by “complex trauma.”137 The lawsuit defined “complex
134. Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. CV-17-08004-PCT-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018); P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
135. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 177–178; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 20. While
the Compton case is a class action lawsuit invoking the rights of all students who may have attended
Compton Unified School District, the Havasupai case was limited to the nine named plaintiffs.
However, both sets of plaintiffs sought system-wide educational reforms as a remedy. The underlying
question in both, is whether the law requires such a remedy.
136. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 224–225; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 65–69.
137. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 69.
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trauma” as exposure to multiple persistent sources of violence, loss, and
other ACEs.138 Plaintiffs pointed to well-known challenges that growing
up in Compton brought, including poverty and high incidences of
violence, to argue that the school district should have been aware of the
likelihood that many of their students were suffering from complex
trauma.139 As a result of this alleged complex trauma, the plaintiffs
asserted they were individuals with disabilities who required specialized
supports and services to meaningfully access education.140
Just a year later, a similar class-action suit was filed on behalf of nine
Native American students who lived on the Havasupai Indian Reservation
and attended public schools operated by the Bureau of Indian Education
(BIE).141 Plaintiffs there alleged that the BIE “knowingly failed to provide
basic general education, a system of special education, and necessary
wellness and mental health support to Havasupai students, resulting in
indefensible deficits in academic achievement and educational
attainment.”142 Just as in the Compton case, plaintiffs invoked Section 504
regulations to claim that exposure to ACEs and complex trauma provided
the basis for eligibility as individuals with disabilities under Section
504.143 They argued that the BIE violated Section 504 by failing to
identify these children as individuals with disabilities and provide them
with necessary supports.144
Children from both communities experience the impacts of poverty,
community violence, and significant family disruptions at alarmingly high
138. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 1. Plaintiffs alleged that 24.6% of children living in Compton
have two or more ACEs. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 2, P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal.
2015).
139. See P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 19–20, 65.
140. Id. at 23.
141. Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. CV-17-08004-PCT-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018).
142. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 2.
143. Plaintiffs define “complex trauma” using virtually identical language to the Compton
plaintiffs, stating, “Complex trauma stems from the exposure to multiple persistent sources of
violence, loss, and other adverse childhood experiences (‘ACE’s’), and describes children’s exposure
to these events and the impact of [such] exposure.” P.P Complaint, supra note 9, at 1 n.1; see Stephen
C. Complaint, supra note 9, at 61–62.
144. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint contained six causes of action, four of which were
brought under Section 504 and its implementing regulations as follows: (1) failure to provide a system
enabling students with disabilities access to public education; (2) failure to provide a system enabling
students impacted by childhood adversity to access public education; (3) failure to implement Section
504’s “location and notification” regulation; and (4) failure to implement Section 504’s “procedural
safeguards” regulation. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 50–62,
Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., 2018 WL 1871457 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018) (No. 3:17-cv08004-SPL).
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levels.145 Thus, in each case, by virtue of being a member of a particular
community, a child is more likely to experience neurobiological effects of
complex trauma resulting in impaired ability to perform activities
essential to education including learning, thinking, reading, and
concentrating.146 Litigants in both suits invoked disability rights laws to
make two claims. First, that by virtue of being a member of their
community, they were “individuals with disabilities” and, as such, entitled
to a FAPE which includes any special education or related services
necessary to ensure equal access to education.147 Second, that school
districts violated child find obligations by failing to affirmatively identify
them as children with disabilities and appropriately accommodate their
needs. Such failure, they argued, amounted to disability discrimination.148
Both also sought systemic relief in the form of declaratory relief and
mandatory injunctions to institute district wide trauma sensitive
practices.149 The plaintiffs’ desired remedies included the following:
(1) training educators to recognize, understand, and address the effects of
complex trauma, in part through building students’ self-regulation and
social-emotional learning skills; (2) developing restorative justice
practices to resolve conflicts peacefully and avoid re-traumatizing
students through the use of punitive discipline; and (3) ensuring that
consistent mental health support is available to appropriately meet student
needs.150 Critically, these remedies require schools to make potentially
145. In this context, family disruptions refer to children being removed from the home and placed
in foster care, parents being forcibly removed from the home due to arrest, or one parent needing to
leave the home to seek employment elsewhere. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 14–37, 163–
70.
146. Compton plaintiffs also argued that students impacted by complex trauma were less able to
conform their behavior to school expectations and consequently, more likely to face discipline and
school exclusion. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 5. Thus, they argued that the school district not
only failed to accommodate students impacted by complex trauma, but that it also engaged in districtwide punitive disciplinary policies that re-triggered students’ trauma-induced disabilities. Id.
147. Id. at 23; Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 14–37, 163–70. Each lawsuit also proceeded
with claims under other statutes as well. The Compton students alleged an ADA violation using the
same facts that supported their Section 504 claim, but Havasupai students did not. P.P Complaint,
supra note 9, at 71−72. The Havasupai students brought a number of claims under federal statutes
and regulations mandating that the BIE provide an education to Native American children that meets
basic educational standards and enables students to access post-secondary educational opportunities.
Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 195–271; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2000, 2001 (2012); 25 C.F.R.
§ 32.3−32.4 (2019).
148. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, at 91–93; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 65, 69.
149. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, at 99–100; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 72–73.
150. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 72–73. Havasupai plaintiffs sought a number of system-wide
reforms including,
(1) comprehensive and ongoing training, coaching and consultation for all adult staff regarding
trauma-informed and culturally sensitive strategies for educating students and fostering a
healthy, supporting environment; (2) implementation of restorative practices to prevent, address,
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significant changes to the current curriculum by adopting teaching of
social-emotional skills as well as restorative justice practices. Further, the
remedies demand such practices be adopted school-wide and not limited
to only those students with a demonstrated need for such supports.
At the time of this writing, both cases have survived motions to dismiss.
Parties in the Compton case are engaged in out-of-court settlement, while
the Havasupai case has completed discovery.151 Consequently, the
question of whether a child impacted by ACEs is an individual with a
disability, thereby receiving attendant rights under disability rights laws,
remains unanswered. A court may ultimately adopt the Compton School
District’s argument that while the “blight of all ‘socioeconomically
distressed cities’ throughout America is rightfully a major
concern . . . [p]laintiffs cannot . . . fashion[] those issues into a question
of disability rights.”152 Courts may also be concerned about judicial
overreach and effectively legislating educational policy from the bench.153
These lawsuits are groundbreaking for two distinct and equally
important reasons. First, they have the potential to expand the eligibility
of students with disabilities to include entire neighborhoods of children
and heal after conflict; (3) employment of appropriately trained counselors who can assist with
identification of students who have mental-health difficulties; (4) adoption of practices and
interventions to enhance student wellness that are responsive to Havasupai beliefs and traditions
and are created in partnership with community members.
Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 63, Stephen C. v. Bureau of
Indian Educ., 2018 WL 1871457 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018) (No. 3:17-cv-08004-SPL). The Compton
plaintiffs requested school-wide trauma sensitive practices with three core components:
(1) training for educators to recognize, understand, and proactively recognize and address the
effects of complex trauma, in part through building students’ self-regulation and socialemotional learning skills; (2) developing restorative practices to build healthy relationships and
resolve conflicts peacefully and avoid re-traumatizing students through the use of punitive
discipline; and (3) ensuring consistent mental health support is available to appropriately meet
student needs.
P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 4.
151. David Washburn, How a Tiny Native American Community’s Trauma Might Impact
Education Law, EDSOURCE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://edsource.org/2018/how-a-tiny-nativecommunitys-trauma-might-impact-education-law/595719 [https://perma.cc/CV2N-ZC63].
152. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Class Action Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 10, P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch.
Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 15–3726–MWF (PLAx)). Compton Unified
School District argued that finding for Plaintiffs would equate to courts dictating educational policy,
something that the Supreme Court has strongly warned against. Defendants’ Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8, P.P., 135 F. Supp.
3d 1098; see infra note 153.
153. The Supreme Court has strongly warned against courts making decisions impacting
educational policy, stating that “courts lack the specialized knowledge and experience’ necessary to
resolve ‘persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent.
Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)); see also Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist.
RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001−02 (2017).
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based on geography and neighborhood characteristics. Second, they
attempt to reconceptualize the purpose of disability rights statutes into
agents of educational reform, impacting educational programs for all
students—not just those with disabilities. The following sections explore
both issues by first discussing whether ACEs-impacted students could be
eligible for statutory protections under the various disability rights laws,
and second, by analyzing a theory of class-based systemic relief under
those laws.
II.

TESTING THE THEORY: ACES AS DISABILITY

Categories of disability are ultimately social constructs and—in the
case of disability rights laws—legal constructs. Both in medicine and the
law, disability labels are ways to describe certain characteristics that
appear connected and others that deviate in some way from expected
patterns of mental or physical function.154 The relevant question for
purposes of accessing protections found within disability rights laws is
whether each law’s respective definition of disability encompasses the
physical or psychological impacts brought on by exposure to ACEs. The
science supporting the link between ACEs and changes to the stressresponse system make it plausible that some children impacted by ACEs
may be eligible for protections under all three laws. Yet, the analysis will
differ under each law and will be highly dependent on the individual
characteristics of each child. The following section will walk through the
eligibility analysis for a child impacted by ACEs and discuss the
challenges to eligibility under each law.
A.

Eligibility Under Section 504 and the ADA

As discussed above, Section 504 and Title II of the ADA are explicitly
interwoven and determining eligibility under either statute requires
largely the same analysis. Thus, the following section will analyze both
laws jointly, noting any relevant differences.155 To be eligible under either
154. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 428–29
(2000). The “social model” of the modern disability rights movement advocates that disability is not
at all a condition of the physical body, but rather the result of an interaction between the body and
society.
155. “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [Section 504] shall be the remedies,
procedures and rights [applicable to ADA claims].” 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2012). “There is no
significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999); 28
C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (2019) (“Except as otherwise provided in this part, this part shall not be construed
to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 . . . or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to that title.”).
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statute, a student must have a “physical or mental impairment” that
“substantially limits one or more major life activities.”156 Both prongs of
the definition are construed broadly.157 The laws do not confine physical
or mental impairments to a delineated list and can include any mental or
psychological disorder.158 Major life activities are also interpreted broadly
and while not confined to specific categories, do explicitly include
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, and communicating. 159
Importantly, a student may be eligible regardless of whether the condition
affects learning as long as the condition substantially limits another major
life activity.160
Section 504 specifically mandates that all children who need, or are
believed to need, special education or related services due to a disability
receive an evaluation to help assess areas of educational need and to
determine placement in the regular or special education setting.161 A student
seeking Section 504 or ADA eligibility as a result of ACEs must undergo
an evaluation designed to root out whether and how such experiences
impact a major life activity.162 Eligibility is not limited to medically
diagnosable conditions, but can also include traits or characteristics
understood to be disabling in certain physical or social environments.163
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(9)(B) (2012), (20)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1)(i). The
Amendments Act amended the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability to conform it to that of the
ADA. The ADA’s current definition of disability means, with respect to a person, “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities; a record of such
an impairment; or being regarding as having such an impairment . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1).
157. Dear Colleague ADA Letter, supra note 125; Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125.
158. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(1)−(2)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (defining “physical or mental
impairment” as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more body systems”); see also U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS, supra note 22 (FAQ # 11).
159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(9)(b), (20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2018); see also Dear Colleague
ADA Letter, supra note 125; Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125.
160. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii); Norfolk (VA) Public Schools, 114 L.R.P.
47372 (Office for Civil Rights, S. Div., D.C. Va. May 16, 2014).
161. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35. The assessment and eligibility process requires schools to “draw upon
information from a variety of sources, including . . . teacher recommendations, physical condition,
social or cultural background” and ensure all information is “documented and carefully considered.”
Id. Thus, when special education or related services are at issue, Section 504 mandates that eligibility
determinations are a team decision and that such determinations involve an examination of data from
a variety of sources. Id.
162. 34. C.F.R. § 104.35(a); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., PARENT AND
EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE TO SECTION 504 IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
12 (2016) [hereinafter PARENT & EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices
/list/ocr/docs/504-resource-guide-201612.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8GV-Q7V6].
163. A specific diagnosis is not necessary if the school determines a student is substantially limited
in a major life activity and that limitation is caused by a mental or physical impairment. 34 C.F.R.
§§ 104.3(j), 104.35; see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENTS WITH
ADHD AND SECTION 504: A RESOURCE GUIDE 23 n.70 (July 2016), attached to Dear Colleague Letter
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While a medical diagnosis is not necessary for eligibility, some
objective measure of the disability and its impacts is necessary.164
Significant research currently demonstrates the impacts of multiple or
sustained ACEs on normal child development, including physical changes
to brain development, an altered stress-response system, and out-sized
reactions to perceived threats.165 Given the enormity of research in the
field evidencing harmful impacts from prolonged exposure to stressful
experiences, it is likely that many children impacted by ACEs will
evidence symptoms that will meet the laws’ definition of a “mental
disorder.” However, it is certainly not true that all children with ACEs
will have the same reaction. Thus, individual evaluations to determine
ACEs’ effects are crucial to determine whether such exposure rises to the
level of a mental impairment in any one child.166
The second part of the eligibility inquiry asks whether the physical or
mental impairment “substantially limits one or more . . . major life
activit[y].”167 This prong is considered in relation to the average person, not
the individual student or their peers.168 The relevant question is whether
disability impacts an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity as
compared to most people in the general population. Given the broad
interpretation of disability that Congress insisted upon in the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, many students living with toxic stress will meet
this prong with ease.169 The research focused on ACEs demonstrates effects
from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Title IX
Coordinators (July 26, 2016), available at www.ed.gov/ocr/letters/colleague-201607-504-adhd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZKV7-2WRP]; Bagenstos, supra note 154, at 428–29.
164. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35; see also U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS, supra note 22 ( FAQ #11).
165. Metzler et al., supra note 51 (citing several studies within this paper); Shonkoff et al., supra
note 52.
166. NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, COMPLEX TRAUMA STANDARDIZED
MEASURES, https://www.nctsn.org/resources/complex-trauma-standardized-measures
[https://perma.cc/2AFL-4DES]; see also KATIE EKLUND & ERIC ROSSEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR MENTAL
HEALTH & JUVENILE JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR TRAUMA SCREENING IN SCHOOLS: A PRODUCT OF THE
DEFENDING CHILDHOOD STATE POLICY INITIATIVE (2016), https://www.nasponline.org/x37269.xml
[https://perma.cc/SD8X-L26P] (discussing the benefits of implementing universal screenings as an
essential component of multi-tiered systems of support).
167. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1)(i) (2019).
168. See, e.g., Weidow v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 460 F. App’x 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2012).
169. Despite the federal guidance, the substantially limits prong may still constrain eligibility by
requiring students to demonstrate that complex trauma impacts a major life activity more than the
average person. A few courts have found students’ claims lacking for failing to meet the substantially
limits prong when factually specific information describing the disability’s impacts was not present
or did not appear severe or frequent. Mann v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 535 F. App’x 405, 411–
12 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding doctor’s note diagnosing a student with anxiety disorder insufficient to
meet the substantially limits prong); Weidow, 460 F. App’x at 185–86 (finding that a student with bipolar disorder failed to present sufficient evidence of substantial impact of the disorder’s effects on
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on attention, memory, learning and executive functioning.170 This research
supports the idea that children impacted by multiple ACEs are
disadvantaged in ways that their peers, who have not had such experiences,
are not.171 Further, some impacts of ACEs including learning and
concentrating are specifically listed as major life activities in the ADA.172
In short, Section 504 and the ADA permit an expansive understanding
of what can qualify as a disabling condition. Students suffering from
impacts of toxic stress will likely be able to find refuge in the laws’
protections. While the eligibility under both laws is theoretically available
to these students, individual eligibility determinations are required.
Importantly, eligibility is not based on one single test or diagnosis, but
rather involves a team decision.173 Thus, it will be crucial for school
officials to be aware of the research behind ACEs and the resulting
impacts on development and behavior in order to make the connection
between exposure to ACEs and impacts on learning, behavior, and/or
other major life activities.
B.

Eligibility Under the IDEA

The IDEA sets much narrower parameters around who is considered a
“child with a disability” and as such, eligible for statutory protections.174
The IDEA limits eligibility to thirteen categories of disability.175 Each
category represents a legal—not medical—definition of disability, and
further instructs that the disability must adversely impact the child’s
educational performance.176 Courts have interpreted educational
performance broadly to include non-academic skills such as behavior and
peer relationships.177 Courts have also interpreted “advers[ity]” to mean
any negative effect and have rejected schools’ attempts to frame this
requirement as “significant” or “substantial” adversity.178 Finally, in order
to be eligible for statutory protections, under the IDEA a child must

her interactions with others despite presenting evidence of peer relationship troubles).
170. Shonkoff et al., supra note 52.
171. See supra section I.A.3.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2012).
173. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35(c) (2019).
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Mr. I. ex rel. L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that a
school improperly denied IDEA eligibility to a child with Asperger’s Syndrome and depressive
disorder whose needs were social and emotional but not academic).
178. Id. at 13.
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require special education and related services as a result of the
disability.179 All three prongs present obstacles to eligibility for students
impacted by ACEs.
Of the IDEA’s thirteen disability categories, students suffering the
effects of toxic stress will most likely be classified under “emotional
disturbance.”180 As one court of appeals aptly described, this category
identifies “a class of children who are disabled only in the sense that their
abnormal emotional conditions prevent them from choosing normal
responses to normal situations.”181 Emotional disturbance encompasses
conditions that occur over a long period of time and to a marked degree.
Such conditions are evidenced by certain characteristics, including inability
to maintain appropriate relationships with teachers or peers, inappropriate
behavior or feelings under normal circumstances, a general pervasive mood
of unhappiness or depression, or a tendency to develop physical symptoms
or fears associated with personal or school-related problems.182 A child
impacted by ACEs may certainly manifest behaviors that could fit several
of the delineated characteristics. In fact, research on the impacts of ACEs
evidences a probability of heightened fears under normal circumstances,
and a child with heightened fight or flight responses could certainly have
trouble maintaining relationships with peers or teachers.183 However,
eligibility must include a professional assessment that evidences ACEs’
impacts to a “marked degree.”184 Thus, many children who are impacted by
ACEs to some degree may not demonstrate behaviors that manifest severely
enough to qualify under this category.185
179. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1) (2019). A student needs special education and related services when
the student requires those services in order to receive an educational benefit from the educational
program. Mr. I. ex rel. L.I., 480 F.3d 1; Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79 (1st
Cir. 2012); Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D. ex rel. Brian D., 616 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2010).
180. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i).
181. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C., 258 F.3d 769, 775−76 (8th Cir. 2001).
182. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i). Emotional Disturbance is a condition exhibiting one or more of the
five enumerated characteristics “over a long period of time and to a marked degree.” Id. The
characteristics are as follows: (i) “[a]n inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual,
sensory or health factors;” (ii) “[a]n inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal
relationships with peers and teachers;” (iii) “[i]nappropriate types of behavior or feelings under
normal circumstances;” (iv) “[a] general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression;” and (v) “[a]
tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems.” Id.
183. Supra section I.A.2.
184. Neither the IDEA statute nor its regulations at 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i) define the
requirement that a student’s qualifying behavior manifest itself “to a marked degree.” OSEP has taken
the position that it generally refers to the frequency, duration, or intensity of a student’s emotionally
disturbed behavior in comparison to the behavior of his peers and can be indicative of either degree
of acuity or pervasiveness. Letter from Judy A. Schrag, Dir., Office of Special Educ. Programs, to
Anonymous (Aug. 11, 1989) (on file with author).
185. While a medical or clinical diagnosis is generally not required in order to be eligible under the
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Even assuming a student clearly exhibits characteristics delineated
under emotional disturbance, the student must also demonstrate the need
for special education and related services.186 The IDEA defines special
education as specially designed instruction that adapts content,
methodology, or delivery of instruction to address the needs of the child
resulting from disability.187 Many ACEs-impacted students will need
mental health supports, but not necessarily a modification to the delivery,
content, or methodology of curriculum. Counseling, psychological, and
social work services are generally considered related services, but not
special education.188 If a child only needs related services, he or she does
not meet the IDEA’s definition of a “child with a disability.”189
Finally, researchers have long bemoaned the emotional disturbance
category as overly broad and prone to subjective bias. Critics argue that
African-American students are more likely to be misidentified with
emotional disturbance due to culturally-insensitive evaluation
procedures.190 Further, children labeled with emotional disturbance have
among the poorest educational outcomes of any IDEA disability cohort.191
Consequently, the value of striving for eligibility under this particular
category of disability is dubious, at best.
While there is certainly a path to eligibility and subsequent protections
under all three disability rights laws, the IDEA is clearly the trickiest to
navigate. Under each law, eligibility is considered on a case-by-case basis,
emotional disturbance category, states can issue their own regulations to further define IDEA
disability categories. For instance, South Carolina requires evidence that a child is rated within the
highest level of significance on a valid and reliable problem behavior rating scale by both a teacher
and another adult knowledgeable of the student; a valid personality measure administered by
psychologist or licensed psycho-educational specialist; and documentation that the student’s
observable school problem behavior occurs at a “significantly different rate, intensity, or duration
than [a] substantial majority of typical school peers.” MICK ZAIS, S.C. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE
OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION AND ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION
(SEED) (2011).
186. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1).
187. Id. § 300.39.
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 300.34; see also Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist.,
427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005).
189. If a child has one of the disabilities identified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1), but only needs related
services and not special education, the child is not a child with a disability under the IDEA. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.8(a)(2)(i). However, if the related service that the child requires is considered “special
education” under state standards, the child will be eligible under the IDEA. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.8(a)(2)(ii).
190. Nicole M. Oelrich, A New “Idea”: Ending Racial Disparity in the Identification of Students
with Emotional Disturbance, 57 S.D. L. REV. 9, 28 (2012) (arguing that the IDEA’s definition of
emotional disturbance contributes to the over-identification of African-American students under this
category of disability).
191. See Mary M. Wagner, Outcomes for Youths with Serious Emotional Disturbance in Secondary
School and Early Adulthood, 5 FUTURE CHILD. 90, 97–99 (1995).
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accounting for the reality that exposure to ACEs will impact children
differently. For some, ACEs will lead to difficulty concentrating,
managing stress, or conforming behavior to expected norms, but this will
not be true for all. Schools, of course, only owe statutorily mandated
duties to children who meet statutory definitions of disability.
But school districts are also obligated to seek out those students who may
have disabilities and determine whether they require special education or
related services. The class-action lawsuits that seek school-wide reforms
through Section 504 and the ADA claim that schools failed to live up to this
duty. Because of schools’ failures to identify students with potential
disabilities and provide them with necessary supports, plaintiffs argue that
schools violated disability rights laws. The following section will turn to the
practical questions presented by class-action lawsuits invoking Section 504
and the ADA to demand systemic remedies for the failure to identify ACEsimpacted students as individuals with disabilities.
III. FLAWS IN THE LEGAL STRATEGY
Attempting to use ACEs research as the foundation for systemic
educational remedies runs into two categories of problems: legal and
societal. To overcome legal hurdles, plaintiffs must demonstrate, first, that
a school’s knowledge of a high probability of ACEs is enough to trigger
the school’s child find obligation; and, second, that a school’s knowledge
of this probability is enough to trigger programmatic changes affecting all
students. To overcome societal problems, two difficult questions must be
answered: (1) does opening the doors of eligibility wide enough to allow
entire neighborhoods of children to be labeled “disabled” have unintended
negative consequences?; and (2) is the risk of stigma outweighed by the
benefits derived from disability rights protections?
A.

The Limits of Child Find

Section 504 represented a “national commitment to eliminate the
‘glaring neglect of the handicapped’” which caused them to “live among
society ‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.’”192 Congress identified
architectural and communication barriers as a central cause of that
exclusion.193 But Congress also made clear that agencies “charged with
administering the Act had substantial leeway to explore areas in which

192. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985) (first quoting 118 CONG. REC. 526 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Percy); and then quoting 117 CONG. REC. 45974 (1971) (statement of Rep. Vanik)).
193. Timothy M. Cook, The Scope of the Right to Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue
Burdens under Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1471 (1987).
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discrimination against the handicapped posed particularly significant
problems and to devise regulations to prohibit such discrimination.”194 In
the context of education, that meant not only prohibiting discrimination,
but also affirmatively welcoming students with disabilities into public
schools. Thus, the statute contains a “location and notification” regulation
that directs schools to find children in their respective communities who
may have disabilities. 195 Courts often refer to this obligation as “child
find” and liken it to a similar obligation found in the IDEA.196
Section 504’s child find mandate is actually driven by two regulations:
the location and notification regulation197 (directed at community-wide
responsibilities) and the “evaluation and placement” regulation198
(directed at an individualized obligation). Class-action suits seeking
reforms under disability rights laws rest on schools’ child find
obligations.199 Plaintiffs claim that school districts shirked this duty by
failing to properly identify ACEs-impacted students as individuals with
disabilities. However, as the following section illustrates, there are limits
to Section 504’s child find mandate that make class actions based on
ACEs exposure tenuous at best.
1.

Child Find: The Obligation to the Community

Section 504’s “location and notification” regulation tasks schools with
providing the community, and specifically parents, notice of the law’s
protections for children with disabilities.200 Courts generally hold that
expansive messaging through posting on websites, newspapers, and in
relevant offices, as well as sending notices to parents of school-aged
children, is sufficient to meet this type of community-based obligation.201
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Education has given school districts
wide latitude in executing the community-wide child find obligation.202
194. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 304 n.24 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 40–41, 56 (1974)).
195. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32 (2019).
196. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111.
197. Id. § 104.32.
198. Id. § 104.35.
199. See infra Part IV.
200. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32 (location and notification) (“A recipient that operates a public elementary
or secondary education program or activity shall annually: (a) Undertake to identify and locate every
qualified handicapped person residing in the recipient’s jurisdiction who is not receiving a public
education; and (b) Take appropriate steps to notify handicapped persons and their parents or guardians
of the recipient’s duty under this subpart.”).
201. P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2009).
202. Letter to Veir, 20 I.D.E.L.R. 864 (Office for Civil Rights, Southern Div., Dallas (Texas), Dec.
1, 1993) (stating “[t]here are many means available including notices to private schools, state and
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The plain language of the regulation only tasks schools with identifying
persons who are not currently in public school and who may have rights
under the act.203 It provides no guidance regarding how schools are to
undertake this identification.204 As to students with disabilities currently
in school, the regulation imparts a duty to “take appropriate steps to
notify” those students, and their guardians, of their rights.205 It does not
demand that schools take any steps beyond notification.206 For instance, it
does not explicitly task schools with evaluating children suspected of
having disabilities to determine whether they would qualify for services.
However, the meaning of child find has evolved since the passage of
Section 504 to include a duty to an individualized child who is suspected
of having a disability. Courts often cite to the location and notification
regulation for support of a broad child find duty that includes an obligation
to evaluate individual students suspected of having a disability. However,
the support for this individualized duty is contained in a separate
regulation, discussed next.207
2.

Child Find: The Obligation to the Individual

The Department of Education points to Section 504’s “evaluation and
placement” regulation as the catalyst for a school’s duty to identify an
individual child who may have a disability.208 This regulation obligates
schools to find individual children who, due to a disability, are “believed
to need special education or related services” and directs schools to
complete an evaluation of such students before “taking any action with
respect to the initial placement of the person in regular or special
education.”209 Importantly, both the plain language of the regulation and
agency interpretation limit the obligation to students who may need

local agencies, and notices placed in newspapers”).
203. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32.
204. Id.
205. Id. Under an even more restrictive reading of Regulation 34 C.F.R. § 104.32, schools only
have the duty to notify those “qualified handicapped persons” who are not receiving a public
education of their rights under the statute. Id.
206. Id.
207. P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
208. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35; see also Dear Colleague ADA Letter, supra note 125; Attending Public
Elementary, supra note 125, at Q9 (“A school district must conduct an evaluation of any individual
who because of a disability ‘needs or is believed to need’ special education or related services.”
(quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.35)).
209. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35.
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“special education or related services.”210 But, courts and agency
interpretations of this regulation do not always align with each other.
Courts interpreting Section 504’s child find reach have held that
schools must refer a child suspected of having a disability for an
evaluation to determine eligibility.211 This duty is triggered upon schools
being “reasonably suspect[]” of disability.212 The law does not explicitly
set forth what would constitute “reasonable suspicion” in this context, and
thus, courts make case-by-case determinations.213 Generally, courts have
held that schools can be liable for violating child find when they knew or
reasonably should have known of disability.214
The U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR)215 is
more nuanced in its interpretation and instructs:
When a school is aware of a student’s disability, or has reason to
suspect a student has a disability, and the student needs or is believed
to need special education or related services, it would be a violation
of Section 504 if the school delays or denies the evaluation.216
210. Id.; see also Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125, at Q9; Dear Colleague ADA Letter,
supra note 125.
211. D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (“‘School districts have a
continuing obligation under the IDEA and § 504’—called ‘Child Find’—’to identify and evaluate all
students who are reasonably suspected of having a disability under the statutes.’” (citing P.P. ex rel.
Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Distr., 585 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2009)); D.G. v. Somerset Hills
Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 496 (D.N.J. 2008) (refusing to dismiss IDEA-alternative § 504 claim
for student with depressive disorder and finding “[i]n establishing a [Section 504] claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendants knew or should have known about the disability”); see also
Zirkel, supra note 114, at 575.
212. P.P. ex rel. Michael P., 585 F.3d at 738 (“School districts have a continuing obligation under
the IDEA and § 504 to identify and evaluate all students who are reasonably suspected of having a
disability under the statutes.” (citing Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253
(3d Cir. 1999), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), as recognized in D.F. v.
Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2012)); see also Nathanson v. Med. Coll.
of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that plaintiffs must prove a school knew or should
have been reasonably expected to know about plaintiff’s disability in order to establish liability under
Section 504).
213. Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1381 (“Neither the Rehabilitation Act nor the regulations specif[y]
what notification is necessary to adequately inform a recipient of a person’s handicap or what
constitutes awareness of a handicap.”).
214. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch.,
486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]o be liable, defendants ‘must know or be reasonably expected to
know of’ E.J.’s disability.” (citing Nathanson, 926 F.2d 1368, 1381 (3d Cir.1991))).
215. OCR is the enforcement arm of the U.S. Department of Education and has the authority to
enforce several Federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in programs that receive federal
funding from the Department of Education, including Section 504 and Title II of the ADA. About
OCR, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE CIVIL RIGHTS, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
aboutocr.html [https://perma.cc/FM4N-VGNR].
216. PARENT & EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 162, at 12 (emphasis added).
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It bases this interpretation on the combined duties in both the location and
notification and evaluation and placement regulations.217
OCR indicates that schools’ knowledge of an existing disability may not
always trigger the need to evaluate if the child does not need special
education or related services.218 Violations of Section 504’s child find
mandate occur where schools either knew of the need for an evaluation
through a request from a parent or through its own observations indicating
that a student has an impairment which impacts academic or behavioral
performance.219 In guidance documents, OCR explains, “[t]he Section 504
regulation does not set out specific circumstances that trigger the obligation
to conduct an evaluation; the decision to conduct an evaluation is governed
by the individual circumstances in each case.”220 Consequently, agency
guidance suggests liability for child find only attaches when a school should
have been reasonably aware of a disability that requires special education
or related services, and not—as some courts interpret—an obligation to
evaluate with knowledge of disability alone.
Finally, Section 504’s child find directive requires schools to refer for
evaluation students suspected of having disabilities that require “special
education” or “related services,” but fails to define either term. The IDEA
suggests that “special education” means specially designed instruction
adapted to an individual child’s needs, and “related services” encompass
almost anything needed to help a student with a disability to access
FAPE.221 Thus, schools must think in broad terms when seeking out
students who may require supports and services.222

217. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32, 104.35 (2019); U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS, supra note 22 ( FAQ #34).
218. Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125, at Q12. At the same time, academic success or
failure is not the only trigger requiring a need to evaluate. Id. at Q9 (“[G]rades alone are an insufficient
basis upon which to determine whether a student has a disability. Moreover, they may not be the
determinative factor in deciding whether a student with a disability needs special education or related
aids or services.”).
219. Valley Oaks (CA) Charter Sch., 115 L.R.P. 52093 (Office for Civil Rights, W. Div., Ca., June
29, 2015); Aurora (CO) Pub. Sch., 61 I.D.E.L.R. 83 (Office for Civil Rights, W. Div., Co., Jan. 14,
2013).
220. Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125, at Q9.
221. The IDEA defines special education as “specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents,
to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2012), and “related
services” to mean “transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services . . . designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free appropriate public education.”
§ 1401(26). The list of IDEA’s related services enumerated in 34 C.F.R. § 300.34 is not exhaustive.
222. For example, related services can include counseling services, transportation, and orientation
and mobility services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34; see also PARENT & EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE, supra
note 162.
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Child Find: The Implications for ACEs

Science convincingly demonstrates that many children who have
experienced ACEs may suffer long-term effects, but does not conclusively
demonstrate that all will. Thus, in the context of ACEs, the question is:
when is a school deemed to have “reasonable suspicion” of a disability
triggering the need to evaluate? The Compton and Havasupai students
argued that schools must begin an evaluation process once they are aware
of the existence of ACEs, and thus, students should be assessed for
eligibility purely based on living in a certain community.223 In effect, their
claim attempts to broaden eligibility to include exposure to ACEs itself,
regardless of the effects of such exposure.
If mere exposure to ACEs is enough to trigger the child find mandate,
then entire neighborhoods of children would need to undergo evaluations
as part of a public-school enrollment process. The Compton and
Havasupai litigants argue that Section 504’s child find obligation requires
precisely that—evaluations to determine whether children in crime ridden
and impoverished communities need special education or related services.
But while the science around ACEs points to a broader understanding of
what may be a qualifying disability, Section 504’s child find obligation
contains some limiting principles.
First, Section 504 does not task schools with finding all students who
may have a disability, but rather only those students who may have a
disability that requires special education or related services in order to
ensure FAPE.224 The root of Section 504’s FAPE mandate is to ensure
equality of educational access.225 Schools must identify students with
disabilities so that they can ensure educational access that is equal to their
peers. For example, a student with a hearing impairment who is able to
understand one hundred percent of what is being said through the use of
a hearing aid does not require special education or related services. Thus,
even though the student with a hearing impairment would be protected by
Section 504 and the ADA’s anti-discrimination provisions, the school has
no duty to find or evaluate the child because they require no special
education or related services.226

223. The Compton plaintiffs were not arguing that “complex trauma” should be recognized as a
new category of disability, but rather that exposure to traumatic events chronically impacts students
regardless of whether an underlying medically diagnosable disability is found. P.P. Complaint, supra
note 9; ¶¶ 1–13; Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 310–316.
224. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35; see also PARENT & EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 162.
225. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33.
226. Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125, at Q11.
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Second, while a “qualified individual with a disability” may be
interpreted broadly, schools are limited in their obligation to those
students by the definition of FAPE. Section 504’s FAPE standard is
defined comparatively—schools must design educational programs to
meet the individual educational needs of qualified students with
disabilities as adequately as their nondisabled peers.227 A need for “special
education” may be triggered when a student needs something different
than what is offered to all other students in order to have equal access to
the curriculum. The same is true for “related services”—supportive
services needed for equal access to the curriculum. In its guidance on
Section 504, the Department of Education states that academic struggles
are not the only signal of a need for special education or related services.
Rather, behavioral struggles, communication inhibitors, or anything
preventing a child from accessing curriculum as equally as nondisabled
peers may signal a need to evaluate for Section 504 eligibility.228
Consequently, while schools are obligated to identify students with
eligible disabilities, Section 504 only mandates they engage in that task
with an eye towards students who require something extra (special
education or related services) to access their education as effectively as
their non-disabled peers.229 Importantly, it does not ask that schools
optimize a child’s educational experience or ensure a particular outcome,
but only that it provide equal access to education.230 Arguably, for
children living in violent and impoverished neighborhoods, the stress of
life in this environment alone would not signal a need to evaluate them
under Section 504. Rather, students must demonstrate the inability to
grasp academic content or conform behavior to school-based norms as
effectively as one’s peers.
That being said, the science linking ACEs to a heightened response to
stress and perceived threats may lower the threshold for when schools are
sufficiently on notice of a suspected disability. For instance, a school
operating in a community where high incidences of ACEs are probable may
be on notice of a child with a disability when a student often violates school
227. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012); 154 CONG. REC. S8342, S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008)
(statement of the Managers to Accompany S. 3406, The Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008); see also Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125125, at Q7 & Q9.
229. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.35, 104.33.
230. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33; Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 420 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Therefore, in
some situations, a school system may have to provide special education to a handicapped individual
in order to meet the educational needs of a handicapped student ‘as adequately as the needs’ of a
nonhandicapped student, as required by § 104.33(b)(1). Provision of special education under this
regulation, however, would exceed the scope of aid authorized by the Rehabilitation Act if this relief
called for accommodations beyond those necessary to eliminate discrimination.”).
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rules or seems unable to conform behavior to acceptable norms. Whereas a
student without known exposures to ACEs who is often disciplined may not
trigger the child find obligation. Thus, an adequate understanding of ACEs
may prompt earlier referrals for suspicion of disability in children who
exhibit problematic behaviors.231 But even school districts with knowledge
of this science may not necessarily run afoul of Section 504’s child find
requirements until students begin demonstrating academic or behavioral
struggles. Essentially, child find is not triggered by exposure to ACEs alone,
but rather still requires reasonable suspicion of a disability requiring special
education or related services.232
Ultimately, child find’s reasonable suspicion standard places
considerable onus on teachers who serve on the front-lines of the
identification process. While teachers are not meant to be experts in
disabilities, by virtue of their daily classroom experiences, they acquire
specialized knowledge about typical child development. It is this
knowledge that allows them to spot variances from the norm. Once they
are aware of a variance, it is their job, with the help of parents and other
school members, to attempt to figure out the root cause of the child’s
struggle as well as identify potential interventions. At a certain point, it is
also a teacher’s responsibility to recognize that specialized assistance may
be necessary and refer a child for an evaluation to uncover the root of a
child’s challenges. Schools that have weak referral systems or schools that
neglect to regularly intervene with struggling students may violate child
find. But the trigger for the evaluation is not knowledge of the disability
itself, rather it is the child’s academic or behavioral struggles.233
Behavioral struggles will be apparent whether the child is eventually
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, PTSD, or is suffering from the effects
of ACEs. What may have changed is a school’s need to evaluate for a
disability upon any sign of behavioral challenges in a population of
students with probable exposure to ACEs. Rather than assume the
behavior is simply the child’s unwillingness to follow the rules, science
may dictate that the appropriate assumption should be to explore exposure
to ACEs and any resulting impacts. The trouble with such an assumption,
even though based in the science of ACEs, is that it has the potential to
stigmatize poor communities of color.234 This unintended, but potentially
dangerous consequence, will be explored more fully in section III.D.

231. See supra section I.A.2.
232. See supra section I.A.2.
233. See supra section I.A.2.
234. See infra section III.D.
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The Limits of Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)

While it may be true that many students exposed to ACEs require
additional supports to meaningfully access education, it is certain that not
all do. Not all children impacted by ACEs will respond in the same way.
Not all will need interventions, and those that do will not all need the same
interventions. Disability rights laws demand that schools find out which
students actually require additional supports and provide targeted services
to meet individual needs.235 Thus, once a child meets the definition of an
“individual with a disability” under either Section 504 or the ADA, the
inquiry shifts to what affirmative actions must schools take in order to
ensure equal educational opportunities.236 This question is answered by
the FAPE regulation.
1.

Clarifying Section 504’s FAPE Obligation

All elementary and secondary school students who qualify under
Section 504 and the ADA are entitled to FAPE, defined as “the provision
of regular or special education and related aids and services that [] are
designed to meet individual educational needs of [students with
disabilities] as adequately as the needs of [nondisabled students].”237
Notably, not all students with disabilities will need supports or services,
but they are all still protected by the laws’ broader anti-discrimination
mandates.238 Courts and agencies interpret FAPE’s limitations differently,
but both agree that the FAPE regulation requires a targeted approach
directed at an individual student’s needs.

235. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32, 104.35.
236. Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)–(5), 122 Stat. 3553,
3554 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012)) (“ADA”); Id. §§ 104.4, 104.34; 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7) (2019); see also Weber, supra note 3535, at 24.
237. Section 504 obligates schools to “provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified
handicapped person” who resides in the school district. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1) (2019). While the
ADA does not specifically address the provision of FAPE, OCR has noted that a district’s obligations
under Section 504 and the ADA “are generally the same.” Nick J. Rahall, House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C., 21 I.D.E.L.R. 575, at 1 (Office for Civil Rights, E. Div. of Philadelphia, June 22,
1994) (on file with author). As such, a district must provide FAPE to students with disabilities to
comply with the ADA. Id.; see also Naco (AZ) Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 23, 107 L.R.P. 39965 (Office for
Civil Rights, W.D., Az., Oct. 2, 2006); Issaquah (WA) Sch. Dist. No. 411, 40 I.D.E.L.R. 53 (Office
for Civil Rights, W. Div., Wash. May 2, 2003); Pleasant Valley (CA) Elementary Sch. Dist., 32
I.D.E.L.R. 6 (Office for Civil Rights, W. Div., Cal., June 29, 1999).
238. Individuals covered by Section 504 or the ADA are also protected from discrimination,
retaliation and harassment, regardless of whether or not they need special education or related
services. 34 C.F.R.§§ 104.4, 104.21-104.23, 104.61; 28 C.F.R. § 35.
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Agency’s interpretation of the FAPE regulation suggests schools must
provide whatever supports are necessary to eliminate discrimination.239
OCR points to the plain language of the regulation as guidance of
Congress’s intent to make elementary and postsecondary schools
accountable for meeting the educational needs of their students equally.240
Consequently, OCR instructs that financial considerations should not
factor in the FAPE analysis.241 Rather, the only consideration should be
whether or not the educational support or related service is necessary to
eliminate discrimination.242 Under this reading, substantial adjustments
may be required to meet the needs of students with disabilities as
adequately as their peers.243
Courts, however, have interpreted the FAPE obligation to mean that “a
school district must reasonably accommodate the needs of the
handicapped child so as to ensure meaningful participation in educational
activities and meaningful access to educational benefits.”244 The
“reasonable accommodations” language is borrowed from the ADA’s
implementing regulations which state a public entity must “make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability.”245 An exception to this mandate applies where the public entity
can demonstrate that making the modifications would “fundamentally
alter the nature of the services, program, or activity.”246 Clearly, the ADA
regulation places limits on schools’ obligations, instructing that schools
must only provide that which is reasonable and setting aside “fundamental
239. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)–(d).
240. Letter to Perry A. Zirkel, 20 I.D.E.L.R. 134 (Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Aug.
23, 1993).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2 (“If a school district is meeting the needs of children without disabilities to a greater
extent than it is meeting the needs of children with disabilities, discrimination is occurring.”).
243. Id.
244. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 274 (3d Cir. 2014) (“However, § 504 does
not mandate ‘substantial’ changes to the school’s programs, and courts ‘should be mindful of the need
to strike a balance between the rights of the student and [his or her] parents and the legitimate financial
and administrative concerns of the [s]chool [d]istrict . . . mere administrative or fiscal convenience
does not constitute a sufficient justification for providing separate or different services to a
handicapped child.” (citing Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2012))).
245. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2019).
246. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 1990).
Confusion about the reasonable accommodation limitation may also stem from separate subparts of
Section 504, which do contain such language. For instance, part B which covers employers contains
a reasonable accommodations limit and part E, which covers postsecondary schools, states when a
recipient can demonstrate that an academic requirement is essential to the program of instruction a
failure to modify will not be regarded as discriminatory. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.12, 104.44 (2019).
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alterations” as unreasonable and thus, unwarranted. By reading
“reasonableness” into the FAPE standard, courts put limits on schools’
obligations to confer FAPE that are not contained in the plain language of
the regulation.247
While both the FAPE regulation and the ADA’s reasonable
accommodations regulations apply to public schools, the ADA’s
regulation should not be read as imposing limits onto FAPE.248 Rather,
the FAPE standard is limited by what is needed to ensure equality.
Importantly, nothing in either law demands that schools provide
“potential-maximizing education,” but rather both task schools with
providing supports and services that give students with disabilities “the
same access to benefits as all other public education students.”249
Essentially, Section 504 and the ADA do not require schools to develop
flawless or even optimal educational programs; rather, both laws suggest
that a reasonable plan designed to meet the needs of students with
disabilities as adequately as their non-disabled peers would suffice.250
Because courts often impose a reasonable accommodations analysis to
claims brought under Section 504 and the ADA, the following section will
discuss ACE claims within the context of both FAPE and reasonable
accommodations. It illustrates how, in either context, class-based
remedies for system-wide programmatic changes stretch the contours of
those obligations.
2.

The Impossibility of Class-Based Remedies for Programmatic
Change

Quite clearly, both laws put limits on how far schools must go in their
provision of disability supports.251 Schools only need to provide those
supports necessary to eliminate discrimination. Within the context of
education, this is defined as offering students FAPE. FAPE, in turn, is
rooted in a school district’s obligation to an individual student. Class-

247. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 274.
248. 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (“Rule of interpretation. Except as otherwise provided in this part, this
part shall not be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791 (2012)) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies
pursuant to that title.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 130(b)(7) (Comments by Dep’t of Justice); 28 C.F.R. ch.
1, pt. 35, app. B, at 673 (“[T]he House Judiciary Committee Report directs the Attorney General to
include those specific requirements in the Title II regulation the extent they do not conflict with the
regulations implementing section 504.”).
249. J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2000).
250. K.K. ex rel. L.K. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Schs., 590 F. App’x 148, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2014); 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.33.
251. 28 C.F.R. § 35.164.
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based litigation stretches the contours of this obligation by forcing FAPE
to into a group-based remedy, something the language of the law clearly
does not contemplate. For a class of plaintiffs to prevail on a claim of
systemwide accommodations under Section 504 or the ADA, they would
need to show that such accommodations are required to eliminate
discrimination. In other words, the system-wide remedy is necessary to
meet their needs as adequately as those of their non-disabled peers.
Because the heart of a systemic claim for services under Section 504 is
situated in a denial of FAPE, the remedy sought (systemic) conflicts with
the nature of Section 504’s FAPE obligation (individualized). Section 504
defines FAPE individually: the statute directs schools to design regular or
special education services to meet the “individual educational needs” of
students with disabilities as adequately as those without.252 It further
mandates that schools conduct individual evaluations of each child
suspected of needing special education or related services in order to
assess individual needs and as a precursor to designing an appropriate
plan.253 By its very definition, the FAPE obligation must be individually
tailored to each child. While a group of children may be denied FAPE, the
remedy must be individual in nature because the very definition of FAPE
is tied to an individual child.254 The law clearly disfavors a one-size-fitsall approach. Rather than a system wide remedy to address FAPE, Section
504 requires an individualized education program suitable to a particular
child’s disability-based needs.
Because Section 504 requires schools to ensure meaningful access
through FAPE and FAPE is, in turn, an individualized comparative
standard, schools arguably cannot fulfill this obligation with a collective
systemic remedy. Rather, schools must fulfill this obligation to each
individual child. Thus, while a school may have denied FAPE to a class
of students by failing to conduct evaluations and design effective
education programs, this failure cannot be remedied by a one-size-fits-all
school-wide reform. Rather, the remedy called for by Section 504’s FAPE
regulation would be to ensure individual evaluations of each child
suspected of having a disability and to ensure the development of
accommodations, including special education where needed, to guarantee
equality within the educational program.
While Section 504 may support systemic remedies that relate to process
including, effective procedural safeguards and comprehensive
evaluations, such systemic remedies are not appropriate when the
substance of the educational program is at issue. The ineffectiveness of

252. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33.
253. Id. § 104.35.
254. Id. § 104.33.
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system-wide substantive remedies is illustrated through a simple
hypothetical. Assume that rather than ACEs, a school district served a
neighborhood of children with varying levels of vision impairment—a
more objectively measurable disability. Once the school is aware that
some percentage of its students are visually impaired, the appropriate
response is not to offer every child the same prescription of glasses, make
the font larger in all textbooks, or offer guide dogs to all children. Of
course, put in this context, such broad and systemic responses sound
absurd. Quite obviously, the appropriate response is to screen each child
to determine the degree of impairment for that child and provide
individualized supports or services. Similarly, system-wide
accommodations meant to address the varied impacts of ACEs are just as
ill-suited to the task. Rather, in both scenarios, the logical first step is an
individualized determination of the disability’s effects on a particular
child—not system-wide accommodations.
Were courts to apply a reasonable accommodations analysis, a claim
for system-wide programmatic changes would still fall flat. Schools could
claim such remedies amount to a fundamental alteration to the nature of
the school’s program. Indeed, several courts have signaled a deference
towards schools when accommodations cause financial or administrative
burdens on school systems.255 Not all, but many program-wide changes
could trigger issues of both cost and administration. Further, the very
nature of a systemic remedy is to change the structure of the status quo,
which may be required to avoid discrimination at least in some cases.256
For instance, the Compton Plaintiffs’ Section 504 claim centered on three
district-wide remedies: (1) training teachers to recognize effects of
complex trauma and teach students self-regulation and social-emotional
skills; (2) developing restorative justice practices; and (3) ensuring
school-wide mental health supports.257 Given what programmatic
structures are currently available in Compton schools, it is easy to see how
the school district could successfully argue that such structural changes
represent a fundamental and costly change to existing school programs.
Determining whether school-wide modification rises to the level of an
unreasonable or “fundamental or substantial modification of its program
or standards” will depend on a district’s current programmatic

255. J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2000); Rothschild v.
Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 1990).
256. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
257. Compton plaintiffs proffered expert testimony alleging that school-wide interventions were
the only effective way to ensure students with complex trauma would not be denied meaningful
access. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 61.
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offerings.258 Demands that schools change curricular content for all
students based on the needs of some may be met with fierce resistance
from schools. Further, such requests are likely to face significant
challenges with courts known for their deference to school officials
around matters of educational policy.259 In essence, such demands make
an end run around the traditional educational decision-makers and ask
courts to effectuate changes to educational policies. Courts will likely be
exceedingly leery of doing so when such changes not only impact all
students, but also seem to be of the type traditionally left in the realm of
school officials and elected school board members.
For instance, the Compton litigants demanded new curriculum (social
emotional learning and self-regulation skills) be taught to all students as
a system-wide accommodation.260 Yet, this type of remedy is the type of
educational policy decision courts have historically been the most
uncomfortable making.261 Indeed, by mandating this change, courts
permit disability rights laws to dictate curricular content for all students,
potentially altering a school’s pedagogical approach to education. On the
other hand, if school districts have already begun to incorporate such
practices, courts may not balk at ordering improvements in existing
programs as such action would not equate to a fundamental change.262
While disability rights laws may provide protections for students
impacted by ACEs, class-action lawsuits that seek systemic remedies
based on a theory that disability is more prevalent in certain
neighborhoods fail to recognize the limits of the laws they invoke. Both
the ADA and Section 504 require schools to provide meaningful access to
education, but this obligation is inextricably linked to a student’s ability
to gain access to statutory protections establishing their status as a
“qualified individual with a disability” and their disability-based needs. 263
Fundamentally, these lawsuits skip the important steps of identifying
who those children are and accounting for the individualized impacts of
their disabilities before demanding appropriate relief. Quite clearly, not
every child exposed to a traumatic experience will respond in the same
way. Thus, even if children in the same neighborhood are all exposed to
community violence (a recognized adverse childhood experience), their
258. Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999).
259. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988,
1001 (2017); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207–08 (1982).
260. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 6.
261. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 1001; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207–08.
262. K.N. v. Gloucester City Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 3d 334, 355 (D.N.J. 2019) (finding that a
requested accommodation could not be a fundamental alteration to a school’s program where the
plaintiff had previously received the accommodation).
263. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
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reactions to that exposure will vary. The supports, accommodations, or
other educational services they may need as a result of this adversity may
vary as well. Essentially, these parties ask courts to assume that all
students who have experienced trauma require the same set of
accommodations in order to meaningfully access education. The science
supporting effects of ACEs on brain development is both reliable and
compelling, but even accepting the research as valid, it fails to sufficiently
inform courts about the impact on any individual child. And when the
laws’ substantive protections are bound to the individual child’s needs,
such class-based suits seek an impossible remedy.
C.

Additional Legal Hurdles

Beyond the limitations tied to the FAPE and reasonable accommodations
regulations, several additional hurdles stand in the way of successfully
leveraging disability laws as agents of educational reform. While all can
likely be overcome, they are worth briefly noting as they help present a
clearer picture of the challenges placed on class-based relief.
The first obstacle arises from IDEA’s exhaustion clause.264 The IDEA
requires that plaintiffs who seek relief available under the IDEA must
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit under any other law,
including the ADA and Section 504.265 The only exception is when the
remedy sought is not centered on a denial of IDEA’s FAPE requirements.266
Whether an exception also exists for denials of FAPE under Section 504 is
unclear.267 Thus, plaintiffs bringing a Section 504 FAPE claim may need to
convince a court that the IDEA’s exhaustion clause does not apply due to
the distinctions in FAPE obligations under each law. Should that argument
fail, plaintiffs may still prevail under one of the exceptions to administrative
exhaustion—most likely by claiming that the remedy sought is a systemic
change incapable of individual relief.268

264. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012).
265. Id.
266. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2017) (holding IDEA
exhaustion not required when the remedy sought is not for the denial of a free appropriate public
education (FAPE)).
To determine whether a plaintiff in a suit brought under a statute other than the [IDEA] seeks
relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), such that the plaintiff is
required to exhaust IDEA’s remedies, a court should look to the crux, or the gravamen, of the
plaintiff’s complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful pleading.
Id. at 743.
267. Id. at 747.
268. D.R. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-13694, 2017 WL 4348818, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29,
2017).
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The second obstacle to class-based relief centers on the exceedingly
murky court interpretations of the intent standard required for Section 504
and ADA claims. Many circuits have held that when plaintiffs seek nonmonetary remedies, such as the declaratory and injunctive relief sought in
ACEs-based class actions, they need not prove intentional
discrimination.269 In these circuits, plaintiffs need only prove
discriminatory effects resulting from their status as an individual with a
disability.270 However, a few circuits require plaintiffs to prove an
“aggravated denial of reasonable accommodation,” which means a
showing of bad faith or gross departure from professional judgment in all
Section 504 and ADA claims.271 While many scholars have criticized this
heightened standard,272 several circuits continue to insist on it in claims
alleging non-intentional discrimination.273 Consequently, plaintiffs
seeking class-based relief, even when alleging non-intentional harms, may
need to prove the school districts’ policies or practices amounted to a
gross departure from professional judgement.274
Finally, to successfully allege that a school district failed to implement
a regulation, plaintiffs must first demonstrate that the cited regulation is
privately enforceable. As a general principle, regulations are only
privately enforceable if their requirements fall within the scope of the
prohibition contained within the statute.275 The Supreme Court has long269. Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56 B.C.
L. REV. 1417, 1433 (2015).
270. Perry Zirkel, Do Courts Require a Heightened, Intent Standard for Students’ Section 504 and
ADA Claims Against School Districts? 47 J.L. & EDUC. 109 (2018) (charting differences in courts’
approaches to requiring intent in disability discrimination cases brought under Section 504 and Title II
of the ADA).
271. Weber, supra note 269, at 1456 (identifying courts that impose a higher standard when
analyzing claims for reasonable accommodations brought by students in schools); see also D.R., 2017
WL 4348818, at *9 (holding that while “a mere disagreement in FAPE is not sufficient to show
discrimination,” plaintiffs’ allegation that school district’s professional judgment in oversight of its
programs, and the allocation of necessary resources have caused discriminatory effects may rise to
the level of bad faith or gross departure from professional judgment).
272. Weber, supra note 269, at 1417; see also Zirkel, supra note 270, at 109.
273. Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982); see Weber, supra note 269, at
1433.
274. See Weber, supra note 269, at 1456. These ACEs based class-action lawsuits have thus far
proceeded under theories of nonintentional discrimination and have sought non-monetary relief.
Plaintiffs allege a failure to identify students with disabilities and failure to provide reasonable
accommodations. Neither of these claims allege that schools intended to harm or discriminate against
students with disabilities, but rather that the effect of the school’s actions or inactions resulted in a
denial of meaningful access to education for students impacted by ACEs. To remedy this
discrimination, plaintiffs demanded declaratory or injunctive relief. See supra section I.C.
275. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–89 (2001). The Supreme Court has interpreted this
to mean that regulations can only be enforced through the private right of action contained in a statute
when they “authoritatively construe” the statute; regulations that go beyond a construction of the
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held that Section 504 itself establishes an implied private right of action
allowing victims of prohibited discrimination, exclusion, or denial of
benefits to seek “the full panoply of remedies, including equitable relief
and compensatory damages.”276 Lawsuits proceeding under a theory of
ACEs as disability invoke Section 504’s FAPE and child find regulations
and, thus, must demonstrate that each regulation is privately
enforceable.277 Recent court opinions suggest they will likely succeed
in both. 278
D.

The Societal Cost

There is no question that students impacted by poverty, community
violence, instability, and other ACEs face significant challenges when it
comes to overcoming the impacts of such disadvantage.279 But, classaction suits seeking systemic services for students exposed to ACEs
essentially claim that all students in poor, minority neighborhoods are
disabled and require something different in order to meaningfully access
educational opportunities. As several scholars have illustrated, painting
with such a broad brush risks further pathologizing predominately poor
and minority communities as dysfunctional and damaged.280 Historically,
false and damaging beliefs about race and poverty have resulted in
policies that stigmatize African-Americans and disproportionately
oppress low-income communities of color.281 A second problem with such
suits is they incentivize a broad remedy which may be effective for some,
but not all students, at the expense of a remedy tailored to meet individual
student needs.
statute’s prohibitions do not fall within the implied private right of action, even if those regulations
are valid. Id. at 284.
276. Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1987).
277. The Havasupai case filed claims for violations of location and notification, procedural
safeguards, and FAPE. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 50–62,
Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. 3:17-cv-08004-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29,
2018).
278. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008); Stephen C., 2018 WL 1871457, at *7.
279. Burke et al., supra note 44, at 412–13.
280. Nancy E. Dowd, Straight Out of Compton: Developmental Equality and a Critique of the
Compton School Litigation, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 199 (2017); Troutt, supra note 63, at 653–55
(cautioning that policies meant to treat widespread psychological trauma could further cement the
narrative that already exists associated poor black families with dysfunction).
281. Troutt, supra note 63, at 653–55 (comparing the well-intentioned objective of systemic trauma
interventions to the current system of child welfare laws and noting that, while child welfare laws
were established for the protection of vulnerable children, “child welfare administration has given
rise to consistent costs that fall disproportionately on the black poor . . . the costs include the stigma
of being considered presumptively dysfunctional people”).
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Consequently, the fight for access to disability rights protections for this
particular group of students comes with significant risks. If children from
poor communities are understood to be somehow broken or dysfunctional,
in large part, because of their relationship to that community, we risk
perpetuating invidious racial stereotypes leading school systems and
educators to buy into a false narrative that all students from these
communities are damaged. Time and again, research shows that teacher
expectations of their students matter.282 And sadly, many teachers lower
their academic expectations when students carry the label of requiring
“special education.”283 While the same fate may not hold true for students
who seek accommodations for effects of ACEs, there is little reason to think
otherwise. The label of “trauma” or “complex trauma” will likely begin to
cloak children or entire schools in assumptions about capability, resilience,
and frailty. In some instances, such assumptions will not work at crosspurposes and children will be able to achieve academic and emotional
successes. But rest assured, there will also be times when teachers demand
less of students with ACEs or assume they are capable of less because of
the label itself. Of course, this result is inapposite to the very purpose for
which disability rights laws were enacted.
A second risk in requesting a system-wide response is inviting schools
to implement broad remedies without looking more closely at the needs
of individual students. In short, it fits all children from certain
communities into one box without regard to their individual needs or
capabilities. Some schools may quickly assume, by virtue of their student
demographic, that a majority of their students suffer the impacts of ACEs
and institute systemic accommodations. Such action will likely be
overinclusive and risks prioritizing the collective response over individual
needs. Other schools, again simply by virtue of student demographics,
may assume that only a tiny percentage of their students have suffered the
effects of trauma and may fail to attribute academic or social challenges
to a potential unidentified disability that requires special education or
accommodations. In either scenario certain students are not served
according to their individual needs.
Finally, such litigation effectively transforms disability rights laws into
agents of educational reform and bypasses the legislative and democratic
282. Nicholas W. Papageorge, et al., Teacher Expectations Matter, I.Z.A. DISCUSSION PAPER No.
10165 (2016) (DE), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp10165.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9LW-N2MK]
(demonstrating evidence that teacher expectations affect students’ educational attainment and
suggesting teacher expectations differ by racial groups in ways that disadvantage black students).
283. Claire Raj, The Misidentification of Children with Disabilities: A Harm with No Foul, 48
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 373 (2016) (discussing the stigma associated with being a child with a disability
including lowering of expectations for academic success from teachers as well as from students
themselves).

14 - Raj (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

1880

1/23/2020 11:34 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1831

systems currently in place to address education policy. Disability rights
laws were enacted to ensure equal access to education which certainly
includes the mandate to modify curriculum for an individual student
where necessary to ensure meaningful access.284 Much less certain,
however, is whether such laws can mandate curricular changes for an
entire school. Education curriculum is normally dictated by the state,
which typically designates such responsibility to local elected or
appointed school boards.285 In this way, decisions about education policy
and curriculum are at least in theory grounded in a democratic process.286
Allowing disability laws to influence such decisions marks a seismic shift
in the way these decisions are typically made in that it removes them from
the democratic process. Certainly, history reveals that at times court
intervention is necessary to force states to make necessary changes to
educational policy.287 State legislatures currently underfunding public
schools and failing to adequately educate students may need the pressure
of litigation to force their hand.288 The point here is simply that disability
laws were not enacted for this purpose, and careful consideration should
be given to whether they should and can be used to bring about such
broad-based changes.
Notwithstanding the above concerns, disability law may have a central
role to play in tackling the pervasive challenge ACEs present. The
following Part will tackle two potential solutions to address the impacts
of ACEs recognizing the limits of disability law and attempting to guard
against over-identification of students as disabled.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Using Section 504 or the ADA as a class-based remedy to provide
systemic changes in schools presents the proverbial problem of trying to
fit a square peg in a round hole. The statutes simply do not have the
capacity to allow for such a remedy. Essentially, litigants are seeking a
systemic change to the educational program based on two assumptions.
First, that there are students with as-yet unidentified disabilities in the
school district, and second, that these students require school-wide
programmatic changes in order to meaningfully access education. While
284. See supra section I.B.
285. See generally SARAH M. STITZLEIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF ITS CITIZENS: SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF ACCOUNTABILITY
(2017).
286. Id.
287. Constance Baker Motley, The Historical Setting of Brown and Its Impact on the Supreme
Court’s Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9 (1992).
288. John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 2351, 2354 (2004).
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the research supporting ACEs may make those assumptions more likely
than not for a large percentage of students, Section 504 and the ADA
demand individualized determinations of disability that require special
education or related services. The laws do not leave room for assumptions
or probabilities.
Moreover, class actions based on a theory of ACEs as a disability bring
to light a tension between the harms of labeling entire communities of
children as “disabled” by virtue of their membership in these very
communities and the science that supports the idea that many, but not all,
of these children suffer real emotional and physiological impacts because
of their membership in this group. Attempting system-wide remedies for
the whole group based on aggregate demographics of the group raises a
problem that statistics literature refers to as the “ecological fallacy.”289
This principle states it is statistically incorrect to assume that one person
in a group resembles the average or typical traits of the group.290 In the
context of the Compton class-action suit, selecting one student at random
in the Compton school district does not provide any statistical confidence
that the child will be any more likely than anyone else in Compton to be
impacted by ACEs and require supportive services to access education.
Thus, broad-based reforms run the risk of being overinclusive. Disability
rights law currently guards against ecological fallacy by requiring
individualized decisions based on each child’s unique needs.291
Addressing a community’s need for services while guarding against the
harms of overinclusion can be accomplished, but doing so requires both
litigation and legislative strategies. The following section proposes two
potential solutions that attempt to address both over-inclusion and a need
for community-wide services. The first involves systematically litigating
child find claims on behalf of students who clearly evidence impacts of
ACEs with the goal of pressuring schools to adopt more efficient
screening tools for ACEs. The second solution requires legislative action
in the form of grant funding to support schoolwide trauma-informed
services directed at schools that educate a significant percentage of
students impacted by ACEs.
A.

Turning Individual Rights into Systemic Solutions

Science reveals a tension between effectively meeting the needs of
students impacted by ACEs and the limits of schools’ obligations under
289. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 218 (Paul J. Lavrakas ed., 2008).
290. David Lubinski & Lloyd G. Humphreys, Seeing the Forest from the Trees: When Predicting
the Behavior or Status of Groups, Correlate Means, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 363, 375 (1996).
291. See supra section I.B.
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disability rights laws. Advocates want early identification of these
students and schoolwide supports for what they believe to be a widespread
problem. But, disability rights laws only require schools to act upon
reasonable suspicion of a disability that requires supports and call for
individualized, not group, interventions.292 In order to bridge this gap
between what the law requires and the research supporting ACEs’ widespread impacts, advocates should focus on bringing a series of individual
child find claims on behalf of those students impacted by ACEs who
clearly demonstrate learning or behavioral struggles. By bringing a series
of these claims, advocates force schools to meet the needs of individual
students and begin laying the groundwork to evidence the pervasiveness
of ACEs. Ultimately, when faced with the reality of mounting child find
claims, schools will be more likely to adopt universal screening tools and
implement systemic reforms, even when not legally required, in order to
more efficiently address the extensive impacts of ACEs.
Adopting this targeted approach could accomplish three important
goals. First, it can pressure schools to voluntarily implement universal
screening for ACEs-related impacts in order to provide supports to
students who need them. Second, it would facilitate a more precise
delivery of services that match individual student needs. Finally, once
schools become aware of the breadth of ACEs within their student bodies,
they may choose to implement schoolwide trauma-informed practices as
a means of remedying widespread effects of ACEs, while still ensuring
individualized services where needed.
The recent Flint, Michigan litigation to remediate the effects of lead
exposure provides useful insights that support this Article’s proposal.293
In 2016, a class of students in Flint, Michigan brought suit under the
IDEA, Section 504, Title II of the ADA, and state laws on behalf of
approximately 30,000 school-age children residing in Flint.294 The
plaintiffs shared the unfortunate incidence of prolonged exposure to
elevated levels of lead in the public water.295 Lead exposure substantially
increases the likelihood of cognitive-related disabilities.296 Thus, the
representative plaintiff class claimed that as a result of this exposure, they
292. See supra sections III.A, III.B.
293. See D.R. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-13694, 2017 WL 4348818 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29,
2017).
294. Id. at *1.
295. Class Action Complaint at 7, D.R., 2017 WL 4348818.
296. Mona Hanna-Attisha et al., Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children Associated with the Flint
Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk and Public Health Response, 106 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 283, 283 (2016); Bruce P. Lanphear et al., Low-Level Environmental Lead Exposure and
Children’s Intellectual Function: An International Pooled Analysis, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS.
894, 894 (2005).
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required “community-wide early screening; timely referral for, and
performance of, evaluations to determine whether they have a qualifying
disability which makes them eligible for special education and related
services.”297 The plaintiffs invoked both the IDEA as well as Section 504
and Title II of the ADA, but the court’s ruling on their substantive claims
focused mainly on the IDEA.298 While the case was ultimately settled, the
plaintiffs’ claims survived a motion to dismiss.299 At that point, the
plaintiffs were able reach a favorable settlement which dramatically
improved child find procedures. The school district agreed to implement
universal screening for potential impacts of lead exposure and facilitate
comprehensive evaluations, including neuropsychological evaluations
when needed.300
The strategy in Flint to strengthen child find procedures offers an
important path forward for students impacted by ACEs and suggests that
improving identification processes, rather than demanding services, is the
first step to reform. Lead exposure is clearly linked with disability, but
exposure does not automatically equate to disability. As the Flint plaintiffs
explained, exposure to lead may have significant detrimental impacts on
learning or other cognitive and physiological impacts, but “it is impossible
to predict in advance how lead will impact a specific individual.”301
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the plaintiffs succeeded because of
the close nexus between exposure to lead and the eventual likelihood of a
disability requiring special education.302 The school district believed it
highly likely that many of Flint’s lead exposed children would eventually
meet IDEA’s eligibility parameters. Once they did, these children would
have a right to demand special education supports and services and could
also bring claims alleging that the school district failed to identify them
within a reasonable amount of time. The school district wisely chose to

297. Class Action Complaint at 7, D.R., No. 16-13694, (Oct. 18, 2016).
298. Id. at 1.
299. D.R., 2017 WL 4348818, at *1.
300. Preliminary Settlement Agreement at 4–7, D.R., 2017 WL 4348818 (Apr. 9, 2018) (No. 1613694), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/ED-MI-0007-0006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7SC-D28W].
301. Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 25, D.R., No. 1613694, (Nov. 17, 2017).
302. Michigan agreed to fund developmental screenings and comprehensive special education
evaluations for thousands of children exposed to lead in public drinking water. The state will create a
registry system where families can choose to enroll their children for the initial screening. Further
assessments, including neuropsychological tests, will be conducted where needed. Settlement
Agreement, D.R., 2017 WL 4348818 (Apr. 9, 2018) (No. 16-13594), available at
http://dataserver.lrp.com/DATA/servlet/DataServlet?fname=D.R._v._Mich._Dept_of_Educ._Final_
Settlement_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7SC-D28W].
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get out ahead of these claims by shoring up their identification process in
order to both find the children suffering the impacts of lead exposure and
design appropriate interventions and supports to meet their needs.
Significant differences exist between disability eligibility based on lead
exposure as compared to ACEs. Lead poisoning is specifically listed as an
example of an acute health problem that could meet the IDEA’s OHI
disability definition.303 ACEs are not. Moreover, the effects of exposure to
lead as compared to ACEs differ dramatically.304 Yet, these differences do
not preclude the viability of similar claims based on a theory of ACEs.
ACEs can be likened to environmental “toxins” that, just like lead, have the
potential to negatively impact learning.305 By virtue of exposure to ACEs
alone, children increase their risk of negative health outcomes.306
Importantly, just like the lead-exposed children, it is impossible to predict
in advance how ACEs will impact any individual child or even whether all
children with ACEs will be adversely affected. Demanding that schools
account for this reality by implementing effective ACEs screening tools
ensures that those students who need services are provided them and helps
guard against over-identification risks. Ensuring effective screening tools
will also help schools gather additional helpful student-specific information
to determine when more comprehensive evaluations might be required.307
Accounting for the differences between ACEs and lead, a successful
ACEs litigation strategy must be grounded in the Section 504 child find
obligation, given the law’s broader eligibility parameters.308 Further,
303. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(9)(i) (2019).
304. Lanphear et al., supra note 296, at 894; cf. Effects, supra note 63.
305. One significant difference between lead and ACEs is that no known antidote exists to lessen
the impact of lead exposure for children. However, children may have varying levels of resiliency
including stabilizing adult relationships, that can lessen the impact of exposure to ACEs. Treatment
of Lead Poisoning, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, https://www.aap.org/en-us/advocacy-and-policy/aaphealth-initiatives/lead-exposure/Pages/Treatment-of-Lead-Poisoning.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZJ9895VY] (finding that the primary treatment for lead poisoning is eliminating the source of lead
exposure).
306. See supra section I.A.
307. Universal screenings may help identify when a child should be referred for comprehensive
evaluation under the IDEA or Section 504 and the ADA. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)–(c) (2018); 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.35(b). In some cases, the IDEA evaluation process may provide a school district with
information necessary to determine eligibility under Section 504 and the ADA. PARENT & EDUCATOR
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 162, at 42. ACEs-related universal screening tools exist and can help
distinguish which students require further interventions due to impacts of trauma. Complex Trauma
Standardized
Measures,
NAT’L
CHILD
TRAUMATIC
STRESS
NETWORK,
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/complex-trauma-standardized-measures [https://perma.cc/2AFL4DES]; see also EKLUND & ROSSEN, supra note 166 (discussing the benefits of implementing
universal screenings as an essential component of multi-tiered systems of support).
308. See supra section II.B. Notably, lead poisoning, unlike ACEs, is explicitly listed under the
IDEA’s “other health impairment” disability category. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(9)(i).
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because exposure to ACEs presents a more tenuous path to a potential
need for educational supports, litigants would be better served by bringing
a series of individual child find claims on behalf of children who clearly
evidenced the impacts of ACEs as evidenced by learning or behavioral
challenges. A series of successful claims would pressure a school district
to adopt improved child find procedures, including universal screenings
for ACEs related impacts. Just as in the Flint settlement, universal
screenings may trigger more comprehensive evaluations when needed.309
Improved child find procedures, beginning with universal screenings,
may uncover an overwhelming need for mental health counseling for a
large swath of students in a school district such as Compton—with
attendant incidents of poverty and community violence. If so, the final
result of an improved screening and evaluation process in a school district
serving a community of students with a high incidence of ACEs may be
the same remedy that the Compton complaint demands. An individualized
screening process that identifies some critical mass of students as
requiring mental health services (as well as instruction targeted at building
social emotional skills) would likely force a district to adopt schoolwide
programmatic reforms. The difference between this Article’s strategy and
that of the Compton plaintiffs is that the school district would elect to
provide those services based on administrative and fiscal efficiencies.
They would rely on the data they begin to develop about their student
population’s collective needs, not just succumb to assumptions. They may
also engage in the regular democratic process to make broader policy
changes and by doing so, may solicit community feedback.
A potential avenue for a class-based child find remedy exists through
the IDEA, but it only tangentially centers on ACEs. It would require a
putative class to marshal statistical evidence of a school district’s failure
to identify students with disabilities as compared to other similarly
situated districts. A class of former preschool-aged children successfully
brought such a claim in the District of Columbia.310 There, plaintiffs
successfully argued that the school district was failing to identify students
with disabilities using national rates of special education enrollment and
expert testimony regarding risk factors unique to District of Columbia.311
Such a claim is based on risks inherent to impoverished urban
jurisdictions.312 Exposure to ACEs may be included as an additional risk
309. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35.
310. D.L. v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
311. Id. at 720.
312. Id. at 728. In D.L., the District court imposed an 8.5% identification benchmark finding that:
although ‘nationally, about six percent of three-to-five-year-olds are identified with
developmental delays,’ the number is likely higher in the District because of its unique risk
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facing children in such environments. The remedy here, like in the
individual claims, is to shore up a school’s child find procedure so that
children who do need supports are provided them.
B.

Creating Federal Grants to Address System-Wide Supports

A second solution involves congressional action in the form of
federal and state grants targeting schoolwide needs brought on by serving
a large population of students impacted by ACEs. Of course, this solution
requires prevailing upon federal and state legislators to direct grant
funding towards communities impacted by ACEs. Once funds were
allocated, school districts could apply for grants upon a showing that their
student population met a threshold percentage of ACEs-impacted students.
Funding could be used to implement schoolwide training for teachers, mental
health counseling, and other evidence-based interventions that have proven
effective in addressing the impacts of ACEs.
The benefits of establishing such grants are clear and compelling. By
requiring a threshold percentage of ACEs-impacted students, grants
would incentivize school districts to establish solid procedures for the
identification of students impacted by ACEs and to be proactive in their
attempts to address this population’s collective needs. Further, facilitating
grants supports a grassroots approach, encouraging communities to identify
their particular needs and the resources that would best meet those needs.
Critics may caution that such grants could incentivize overidentification of students impacted by ACEs.313 While this raises a
legitimate concern, grants would not need to be tied to disability
identification, but rather, could be tied to data gathered in universal
screening tools. Grants may be awarded to schools who can demonstrate
that a certain percentage of their student population has experienced four
or more ACEs, regardless of whether or not those students could qualify
as “individuals with disabilities.” While compelling legislative action will
undoubtedly be challenging, there are at least two reasons to suggest this
may prove a viable path forward. First, ACEs have emerged as a pressing
national issue gaining grassroots momentum in recent years, making it
ripe for aggressive lobbying efforts and legislative action. Second,
factors, including unusually high rates of poverty, child homelessness, single-parent and nonEnglish-speaking households, incidence of low birthweight and HIV/AIDS infection, and
participation in supplemental assistance programs.
Id.
313. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools:
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for
Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 412 (2001) (“Although African Americans
appear to bear the brunt of over-identification, the evidence indicates that all minority groups are
vulnerable to discrimination in identification for special education.”).
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successful models of competitive grants for targeted educational
improvements already exist, marking a clear path forward for similar
grants addressing ACEs.314
Over the last decade, a concerted grassroots movement to educate
schools and parents about ACEs has taken considerable hold.315 A
significant uptick in both state and federal ACEs-related legislation is
irrefutable.316 Many of these proposed bills, particularly at the federal
level, have focused on addressing trauma through health care systems
rather than schools.317 Notably, Illinois recently passed legislation that
would mandate schoolwide social emotional screening as part of every
child’s regular school enrollment.318 As grassroots movements around
ACEs continue to grow, advocacy groups can lobby for financial support
at local, state, and federal levels that is targeted at remediating the effects
of ACEs in schools. While universal screening is an excellent first step,
schools will need additional dollars to implement training and offer
comprehensive mental health supports to fully address student needs.319
In many ways, the groundwork has already been laid for these efforts.320
Moreover, several education-based grant programs serve as successful
models of funding streams targeted at addressing unmet needs of specific
cohorts of students. A successful federal program could be created

314. Office of Special Educ. Programs, DISCRETIONARY GRANTS DATABASE
https://publicddb.osepideasthatwork.org/
[https://perma.cc/74L8-SL4D]
[hereinafter
DISCRETIONARY GRANTS DATABASE].
315. Alexandra Maul, State and Federal Support of Trauma-Informed Care: Sustaining the
Momentum, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.chcs.org/statefederal-support-trauma-informed-care-sustaining-momentum/
[https://perma.cc/ZH5G-FGFH]
(referencing almost forty bills in eighteen states that were submitted to legislatures in 2017). The bills
instituted a variety of practices including ACEs screenings, trainings, and interdisciplinary
collaboration between healthcare, education, child welfare, and behavioral health providers. Id.
316. Id.; see also Jonathan Purtle & Michael Lewis, Mapping “Trauma-Informed” Legislative
Proposals in U.S. Congress, 44 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. RES. 867, 870 (2017)
(finding that forty-nine bills were introduced in U.S. Congress that used trauma-informed language).
317. The Trauma-Informed Care for Children and Families Act of 2017 was introduced in Congress
in December 2016 and aims to increase understanding and awareness of trauma and identify best
practices for prevention and treatment. S.774, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017–2018).
318. Ill. S.B. 565, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017).
319. EKLUND & ROSSEN, supra note 166, at 8–9 (discussing the benefits of implementing universal
screenings as an essential component of multi-tiered systems of support).
320. Massachusetts enacted a state law that provides grant funding to develop trauma-sensitive
schools. Initially, the law provided grants to schools interested in developing the infrastructure for
teacher training, counseling and other classroom accommodations to support the “psycho-social needs
of children whose behavior interferes with learning, particularly those who are suffering from the
traumatic effects of exposure to violence.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 69 § 1N (2016). A second law was
passed to impose standards on trauma identification and appropriate accommodations. Id., ch. 69
§ 1P.
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through discretionary grants, a competitive application process
administered through the Department of Education, or through set- aside
funding provided through the IDEA. The U.S. Department of Education
already facilitates the distribution of several targeted discretionary grants,
including funds targeted at training for bilingual teachers, implementation
of schoolwide positive behavioral interventions and supports, and
developing effective partnerships between schools and mental health
systems.321 The Office of Special Education Programs also facilitates
discretionary grants to meet discrete needs within the special education
community and funds programs specific to the development of traumainformed practices.322 Another funding stream could be dedicated through
the use of a portion of money already allocated to states through the IDEA.
This would require amending the IDEA, but such amendments have been
successful in the past. In 2004, Congress amended the IDEA to include a
provision for the permissive use of funds directed at early intervening
services.323 The point was to target funds and, consequently, services
towards students who were struggling academically or behaviorally, but
who were not yet identified as eligible students with disabilities.324
Similarly, IDEA funds could be directed to benefit students impacted by
ACEs who require interventions to address behavioral or academic
challenges, but who may not be eligible as students with disabilities under
the law.
The focus on creating funding streams for grant-based programs to
address the impacts of ACEs is not without its challenges. It will require
effective lobbying and advocacy to convince legislators to direct funding
to this cause. Even if passed, school leaders would have to apply for such
funding. Many school leaders and districts are already overwhelmed with
the number of grant and IDEA reporting requirements that are necessary
for existing school programs. However, if research around ACEs is
correct, the problem is widespread and touches many communities at a
fundamental level. For some communities, school-based supports may be
the most effective tool to improve not only academic outcomes, but also
ensure a greater chance of long-term success outside of the classroom. As
the evidence-based practices to help stem the tide of ACEs become more
321. Forecast of Funding Opportunities Under the Department of Education Discretionary Grant
Programs for Fiscal Year (FY) 2018, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/fund/grant/find/edliteforecast.html [https://perma.cc/3JMK-H9M6].
322. DISCRETIONARY GRANTS DATABASE, supra note 314.
323. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(f) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.226 (2019) (permitting school districts to use up
to 15% of funds it receives through IDEA’s Part B formula grant to provide early intervening services
to children who are struggling academically or behaviorally but are as yet, unidentified).
324. 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,626–28 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 300–301).
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effective and prominent, the desire to implement them should only
increase.325 If so, the resources—not the resolution—to implement them
will be most crucial.
CONCLUSION
Children living in communities plagued by drug epidemics, marred by
violence, and devoid of economic development are, undoubtedly, affected
by their environments. Quite clearly, these children face an uphill battle
for educational success and have largely been left to fight it alone.
Advocates should be commended for shining a light on these inequities
and for their attempt to bring immediate remedies to ACEs-impacted
students. The breadth of this problem requires both immediate and largescale solutions. But distorting disability rights laws in an effort to create
systemic remedies is both unfeasible and potentially harmful.
An effective solution demands a more nuanced legal strategy and the
tenacity to engage lawmakers. Advocates should harness the power of
individual students’ viable claims to pressure schools for universal ACEs
screenings. Screenings will sort children impacted by ACEs from those
who are not and serve as the gatekeeper to the services that students with
disabilities so desperately need. With actual knowledge of disabilities,
schools are obligated to target services at individualized needs. And if
aggregate data revealed the need for schoolwide interventions, schools
could go one step further and implement them.
Given the scope of need in these schools and the limited resources they
have to meet them, existing law alone may not be enough to secure
effective remedies. Advocates must also channel the grassroots
momentum around ACEs awareness to lobby state and federal legislatures
for targeted funds. These funds could be used to implement school-wide
programs that do not involve disability determinations, thus averting the
potential for over identification of students as disabled. Legislative reform
is never easy, but the science evidencing the impacts of ACEs is
undeniable. Schools and lawmakers either leave students to confront these
weighty challenges on their own, or they can act now to provide students
with supports that make a meaningful difference.

325. CTR. ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD AT HARVARD UNIV., FROM BEST PRACTICES TO
BREAKTHROUGH IMPACTS 19 (2016), https://46y5eh11fhgw3ve3ytpwxt9r-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/From_Best_Practices_to_Breakthrough_Impacts-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AR9L-KSP8].

